Can science build an accurate representation of the physical world?

[Coldcreation]

Can science build an accurate representation of the physical world?

Is there a picture of nature that science builds (or could build) that might actually be a true representation of physical reality? (This question is phrased with terminology used by Len Moran: see context below.)

Is that goal even attainable, now or some time in the future?

Are we limited by some fundamental boundary condition that will inevitably lead to failure in the quest to answer the question: What is the nature of the universe at it's most fundamental level?

What is the most fundamental level of nature?

If there is a 'veiled' realm beyond which we cannot explore⎯even in principle⎯would this aspect of nature be essential to our understanding of the physical universe? Or can we draw a realistic picture of nature without knowledge of what resides (if anything) beyond this boundary?

Would this realm even be considered part of nature, or could this be evidence that there exists something beyond nature; something so fundamental that without access to it (whatever that is) our understanding will remain forever flawed, or incomplete?

_____________________

The central topic here (expressed in question-form above) is one that evolved from a question posed in another thread: "Is there design in the universe?"

The current discussion began with the introduction [by Len Moran] of the idea "that science has such boundaries beyond which familiar concepts of time and space may not exist? [A concept derived] from Bernard d’Espagnat (and also Ken G on this forum) who has written much on this (for example, “Veiled Reality” and “On Physics and Philosophy.”

The continuing of this discussion in a new thread was essential for several reasons: it is wider in breadth and scope (i.e., not just limited to "design"). There is an empirical premise, a scientific discourse, that underscores the boundary condition inherent in nature (between that which is observable, knowable and that which is not, even in principle): As opposed, to an idea [design] entirely based on subjective philosophical or theological speculation⎯though, here too, these aspects may not be avoided⎯as to the origin of the observed structure (e.g., galaxies, DNA, etc.) and the formation processes (either naturally occurring and describe by physical laws and scientific theories that make testable predictions, or the result of something outside the purview of science, something supernatural with a metaphysical core, that is not verifiable).

The "design" thread had become so discouragingly long, that newcomers, rather than sifting through it, would inevitably bring up arguments that had already been covered. This fact can be observed in the posts that follow this unbiased synopsis of the entire "design" contention.

Too, one of the problems with the "design" thread was implicit from the outset: in the OP itself. It was interpreted as a query related to philosophy and/or theology, depending on ones personal agenda (so it seemed).

Those setbacks will likely follow from the questions above. To be clear, this is an inquiry based on science and what knowledge is attainable through the scientific method (what are the limitations). It is not about philosophy or theology: though, the scope is wide enough to include certain aspects of the latter.



CC

[Coldcreation]

The following is a response to Len Moran in relation to the concept of "design." From here, it is hoped that the discussion will evolve and expand beyond the concept of "design" and, perhaps, include answers to some of the questions above.

My main reason for bringing d’Espagnat’s thesis to your thesis in general was purely in relation to my understanding, as far as it goes, with regards to a central premise that seems to have been ever present within your writings in this thread. So as to be clear on this, I would like to state this premise as I perceive it so as to avoid any misunderstanding on my part and then utilise it in terms of your thesis on supernatural design.

Fair enough.

Your premise is that science, in principle, is capable of resolving all of the mysteries of the physical world, subject to the technical issues of observing equipment or the practicalities of experiments in terms of energy requirements etc, examples of which you have been readily forthcoming with. In other words, we can, in thought, extend the principles of scientific observation to arrive at a conclusion that says science, in principle provides us with a means in which to investigate the physical world in it’s entirety, so that we can get closer and closer to nature at it’s most fundamental level, but we will probably never reach that final end point due to technical limitations of our observing apparatus.

...and due to limitations with respect to the limited velocity of light c, the degradation in photon energy by (1 + z) due to the redshift (no matter what its cause), and the second factor of (1 + z) due to the dilution in the rate of photon arrival caused by the stretching of the path length in the travel time (if the expansion of the universe is real).

These resulting physical limitations are not solely technical limitations of our observing apparatus.

This premise can be utilised in establishing (according to your arguments) the erroneous nature of “design” in terms of the physical world in that the scientific method does not require any notion of design when considering the workings of the models. Science does not so much rule out the concept of design, emanating from a supernatural source, rather it renders any requirement for such design as null and void within the picture of nature that science builds – a picture that is a true representation of physical reality that consists of objects existing independently of our presence and in the same familiar form within space and time as we perceive it macroscopically.

I would even go a little further: Science does rule out the concept of design, emanating from a supernatural source, since there is no supernatural source. As a result science renders any requirement for such design as null and void within the picture of nature.

I'm not sure I agree with your "picture of nature that science builds."

A "true representation of physical reality" is quite a philosophical pill to swallow. Perhaps the word "true" in the sentence should be changed to 'acurate.' I see the problem as one of science; as an ongoing effort of exploration and discovery, the goal of which is to increase human knowledge and understanding through research. The analyzes of this information is used to construct theoretical explanations or models of how nature works. It is based on measurable and recordable observational data of natural or social phenomena.

Now the crucial bit for me is this: What happens to your thesis if it were the case that nature at its most fundamental level could not in principle be investigated by science? It is my contention that if one were persuaded to adopt this view, one would have to come to terms with the notion of a reality, fundamental to our existence and all that we observe, but of a “form” that cannot be investigated by science. If we cannot investigate this “something” scientifically then we have no basis in which to rule out “design”, we have no scientific picture in which to say “design is not required” as we can do within macroscopic reality. Note, very importantly, that this limitation of science would not be due to technical limitations of the observing equipment, or even due to your valid comment about the visual horizon. All of these scenarios you mention, (however you define their effects on science and observation), in my view would fall within your central premise, namely that in principle, science can address the issues despite the technical or other kinds of limitations we have talked about.

Here, correct me if I'm mistaken, it seems your assumption is that "nature at its most fundamental level" is a kind of ultimate reality that we may never gain access, and so will obligatorily fail in the quest to discover the true meaning of existence, of the universe, of nature, of "ultimate reality." I assume too, you refer to the realm of quantum mechanics, where things like non-locality or uncertainty in the velocity or position of, say, an electron, will forever elude or dreams of explaining the natural world in terms consistent with a world-view free of the supernatural.

With due respect, I will have to disagree with that assessment. I don't think that knowing whether an electron is a particle or wave, or knowing the exact location or velocity of an electron is the key to understanding "ultimate reality." It's just another duality or uncertainty that we'll have to live with for the time being (and perhaps forever). There are many dualities in nature, but they may or may not be associated with nature at its most fundamental level; they may or may not be associated with an aspect of nature fundamental to our understanding. And they certainly are not associated with anything supernatural.

And since nothing supernatural seems to be operating at this fundamental level, design is not required to address these issues, and indeed, design does not address those issues.

Also, what do you mean by "this limitation of science would not be due to technical limitations of the observing equipment"? Are you saying that, even in principle, there are particles (or the effects of which) that would remain unobservable (no matter how large a particle accelerator)?

Design isn't ruled out because of what we don't know (or can't know), it is ruled out because of what we do know.

I appreciate everything you have said regarding your views on how we define the limitations of science, but I don’t think you have (perhaps) quite appreciated what I mean by the limitations of science, and it is this difference between us that is the key to our disagreement as to the applicability of your thesis. For you, the thesis is wholly relevant to our understanding of the physical world and (I assume) a refutation of any kind of supernatural involvement. For me, your thesis is only applicable to our macroscopic reality. But this then leads to a more fundamental disagreement - for you (at least I assume it is), macroscopic reality is essentially the only reality that exists, it is a reality that is broadly of the same form with or without our involvement. For me, macroscopic reality is but a human representation of a more fundamental reality that is not of the same form involving space, time and objects.

I assume by "macroscopic" reality you refer to the things we can and do observe, from superclusters of galaxies, en passent par DNA, and perhaps even down to scales compatible with fundamental particles that have been detected, since that is where the non-observability of the microscopic world begins. Is that correct? If not, where do you draw the line between macroscopic and microscopic?

To continue, macroscopic reality is not the only reality that exists, since we observe, in particle accelerators, things and events of the microscopic world. Certainly there exists things (particles, waves?) that are too small to 'see' or elusive enough to remain beyond reach. That too must for part of our world-view. But the question is, how important are those small pieces of the puzzle in the big picture? And yes, it is a reality that is broadly of the same form with or without our involvement.

My opinion differs from yours also in that our macroscopic reality is not a human representation of a more fundamental reality, and that it is of the same form involving space, time and material objects (and their constituents such as, elementary building blocks and nest of forces defined as elementary particles, atomic nuclei, atoms, molecules, ions, and field, such as gravity fields and electromagnetic fields: along with the properties energy, entropy, etc). Too, that these are all bounded by the same fundamental laws of nature. I would add that life, along with the property of consciousness, should be included in the list above.

So there is no fundamental reality outside of spacetime, not outside the universe, no supernatural world hidden from view. The 'things' that are not accessible to observation are within spacetime and are entirely natural in that they form part of the same fundamental reality as things observed macroscopically. The laws of physics would be operational even for those events and phenomena that transpire beyond our visual horizon (both macro- and microscopically). That is the stance I defend.

So whilst I broadly agree with your thesis as regards macroscopic reality, in terms of its applicability to nature at it’s most fundamental level, the thesis has no relevance, so science, at this level cannot rule out design (in a very general sense) from a supernatural source. Now I appreciate that you make the comment that within this thread, design was generally referred to objects we observe, but I would say that in the spirit of your thesis, the refutation of “design” in this context is but a broader sweep against the concept of supernatural design being responsible for the physical world and the use of science to thoroughly back up this position. From the vantage point of ontological realism, it is perfectly legitimate to make such a claim, but from the perspective that I bring, it is most definitely not.

I hope the explanation above sheds more light on the relevance the thesis I defend. There does not exist two different fundamental realities; one macroscopic based on observation, the other microscopic and hidden (or veiled). Both the macro- and microscopic world are governed by the same set of fundamental laws.

Science, from this perspective, can and does rule out design.

So what is the difference between your concept of the limitations of science and mine (or at least I should say d’Espagnat’s since it his primarily his ideas that I make use of), although I should say that there have been many discussions on this forum of similar ideas involving the ideas of Ken G that (very interestingly for me) arrive at the same conclusions as d’Espagnat but via slightly different routes. Essentially, d’Espagnat considers that quantum mechanics predicts observations. The use of the term “observations” is not meant in any superficial sense; it is used as a most fundamental requirement within quantum mechanics and involves the very important notion of counterfactuality (or I should say, the breakdown of counterfactuality). At all times before and during the measurement chain, we are only ever taking about observations, we are not talking about “objects” having a particular value or a unique macroscopic existence without that observation. Even from the point at which a superposition becomes one or other of its values, that outcome has only attained a macroscopic value through our perception, and decoherence theory models this procedure – quantum predictions give rise not only to the outcomes we perceive, but to many other outcomes that we are incapable of resolving. This is fundamental to the quote from d’Espagnat that you included:

"The doctrine that the world is made up of objects whose existence is independent of human consciousness turns out to be in conflict with quantum mechanics and with facts established by experiment"

Certainly, d’Espagnat explores the the edge of positive knowledge, and even surpasses it.

But again, I wouldn't be tempted to fill in the 'unknown' with anything synthetically contrived in a way that would be consistent with a system of belief (as in the philosophical or theological sense), or based on the idea that something 'outside' our sphere of knowledge must obligatorily be outside the purview of science.

The reason is that analyzes of the information gained from the study of the macroscopic world (the world that is observable, including subatomic scales currently testable) is used to construct theoretical explanations or models of how nature works at all fundamental levels, at all scales. It is based on measurable and recordable observational data of natural phenomena then extrapolated to scales or distance that remain beyond detection (where measurable and recordable data is non longer attained). Surely, these conceptions of nature remain theoretical model constructs (based on a proponderance of current evidence) that attempt to accurately represent the natural world, but without ever claiming the models represent absolute truth, and without the need to invoke metaphysical appendages.

A brief note on d’Espagnat's sentence above. I would say that the world is made up both of objects whose existence is dependent and independent of human consciousness.

What he means by this is that the ontological realist standpoint that sees “objects” as having existence independent of human consciousness in the same manner as our macroscopic reality (in terms of time, space and form) is in conflict with the experimental results of quantum mechanics. From this arises a notion of reality that exists independently of human consciousness which is of a form that is inaccessible through science and of a nature that does not exist in terms of space and time.

My bold.

How does it follow from d'Espagnat's sentence the idea that there exists a reality of nature (independent of consciousness and science) which "does not exist in terms of space and time"?



To be continued...


CC

[korjik]

Can science build an accurate representation of the real world?

Yes, it can. The most accurate representation is called:

The real world.

What you may want to ask is: Do we know everything?

In that case, the answer is no. We dont know everything, so what we understand is limited when you get to very large or very small scales.

[Coldcreation]

Can science build an accurate representation of the real world?

Yes, it can. The most accurate representation is called:

The real world.

Hmmm,

I just looked up "real world" on Wiki to find out what it meant. Here is what I found:

Real World may refer to:

• "Real World" (song), by D-Side
• "Real World", song by Matchbox Twenty
• Real World (The All-American Rejects song)
• "Real World" (Queensrÿche song)
• Real World Records, a record label
• The Real World, a television show
• "The Real World" (Stargate Atlantis), a television episode
• The Real World?, a play
• "Real World", a song by Pere Ubu, from their debut album The Modern Dance.
  
  See also
  
• Real life
• Welcome to the Real World

The last one is my favorite; After Real World Records of course.

What you may want to ask is: Do we know everything?

In that case, the answer is no. We dont know everything, so what we understand is limited when you get to very large or very small scales.

Well no. That question is a good one but wasn't in the OP. We obviously don't know everything: As of yet anyway.

Several questions being asked (related to you answer) are: If there is a 'veiled' realm beyond which we cannot explore⎯even in principle? Would this aspect of nature be essential to our understanding of the physical universe? Or can we draw a realistic picture of nature without knowledge of what resides (if anything) beyond this boundary?


CC

[Coldcreation]

Continued from above:

I only offer that brief description of d’Espagnat’s thesis as a means of placing my perspective in terms of your contribution to this thread into a context that is supported by science as per his writings rather than offering it as a scientific explanation that I can adequately defend (which I can’t) - I am still taking on board all of his ideas (and trying to fully understand them, especially decoherence theory in relation to macroscopic outcomes). But the important point I want to try and get across is the fundamental difference between what I perceive as the limitations of science and what you perceive as the limitations, and that the limitations I see are not at all connected with the limitations of the observing or experimental apparatus, they are limitations of science not being able to access nature at its most fundamental because at this level it is of a form that we can have no conception of, a form that has no comparisons with the entwined nature of observer and nature that gives us our empirical reality and macroscopic reality. This is the basis of d’Espagnat’s thesis. Whilst you are correct that such a reality can not be “explained” any better under a philosopher’s microscope than it can under a scientific one that is not the point of my argument.

I disagree with your contention (or d'Espagnat's) about the perceived "limitations of science not being able to access nature at its most fundamental because at this level it is of a form that we can have no conception of, a form that has no comparisons with the entwined nature of observer and nature that gives us our empirical reality and macroscopic reality."

We've established and agreed that there are limitations due to apparatus (etc.), but the idea that that we can have no conception (even in principle) of the entwined disposition of observer and nature that furnishes our reality based on macroscopic experience (our empirical reality), resulting in a further limitation, does not seem to me essential or mandatory feature imposed by QM (or the microscopic reality).

For several reasons: (1) I don't think there are limitations to what we can imagine or conceive, (2) there are many examples of macroscopic manifestations of quantum effects that lead to insight about both the micro- and macroscopic world (e.g., superfluidity, superconductivity, BEC, etc.), and (3) microscopic effects of energy transfer result in an irreversible cascade-type progression leading to macroscopically observable effects.

So the quantum world (regardless of whether it represents ultimate reality or not) is not as veiled as some would believe. Science would have both direct and/or indirect access to this realm, just as we have direct (via telescopes) and indirect access (via telescopes and models), to objects near and beyond the visual horizon (at least in principle, and at least by extrapolation and interpretation of that which is observed).

I only offer that brief description of d’Espagnat’s thesis as a means of placing my perspective in terms of your contribution to this thread into a context that is supported by science as per his writings rather than offering it as a scientific explanation that I can adequately defend (which I can’t) - I am still taking on board all of his ideas (and trying to fully understand them, especially decoherence theory in relation to macroscopic outcomes). But the important point I want to try and get across is the fundamental difference between what I perceive as the limitations of science and what you perceive as the limitations, and that the limitations I see are not at all connected with the limitations of the observing or experimental apparatus, they are limitations of science not being able to access nature at its most fundamental because at this level it is of a form that we can have no conception of, a form that has no comparisons with the entwined nature of observer and nature that gives us our empirical reality and macroscopic reality. This is the basis of d’Espagnat’s thesis. Whilst you are correct that such a reality can not be “explained” any better under a philosopher’s microscope than it can under a scientific one that is not the point of my argument.

I disagree with your contention (or d'Espagnat's) about the perceived "limitations of science not being able to access nature at its most fundamental because at this level it is of a form that we can have no conception of, a form that has no comparisons with the entwined nature of observer and nature that gives us our empirical reality and macroscopic reality."

We've established and agreed that there are limitations due to apparatus (etc.), but the idea that that we can have no conception (even in principle) of the entwined disposition of observer and nature that furnishes our reality based on macroscopic experience (our empirical reality), resulting in a further limitation, does not seem to me an essential or mandatory feature imposed by QM (or the microscopic reality).

For several reasons:

(1) I don't think there are limitations to what we can imagine or conceive, (2) there are many examples of macroscopic manifestations of quantum effects that lead to insight about both the micro- and macroscopic world (e.g., superfluidity, superconductivity, BEC, etc.), and (3) microscopic effects of energy transfer result in an irreversible cascade-type progression leading to macroscopically observable effects.

So the quantum world (regardless of whether it represents ultimate reality or not) is not as veiled as some would believe. Science would have both direct and/or indirect access to this realm, just as we have direct (via telescopes) and indirect access (via telescopes and models), to objects near and beyond the visual horizon (at least in principle, and at least by extrapolation and interpretation of that which is observed).




To be continued...


CC

[mugaliens]

Can science build an accurate representation of the physical world?

No. It can approximate it, and for some things quite well, but for dyanamic systems (i.e. weather), only for limited durations of time before reality diverges from the predicted model.

[Coldcreation]

No. It can approximate it, and for some things quite well, but for dyanamic systems (i.e. weather), only for limited durations of time before reality diverges from the predicted model.

So it seems your answer is yes for some things, and no for others. What about for the topic of this thread?


CC

[Len Moran]

CC

I think the fundamental disagreement between us really rests with your stance as a physical realist, and indeed, as I mentioned, d’Espagnat’s writings are really an attack on this position, based on his in depth knowledge of quantum mechanics (as a theoretical physicist) and his position as a philosopher. I think all I can do is outline his contention as I understand it (and agree with as a spectator) without attempting to argue in terms of detail, much of which I find quite difficult.

Firstly there are a couple of points to make – I certainly do not advocate the notion of an inaccessible reality as being some kind of argument for supernatural design at all, my only point is that science cannot be used to refute the notion within this area of ultimate reality. There have been instances from some sectors as proclaiming this notion as a means of justifying a supernatural creator or designer – something that is not at all within the remit of d’Espagnat’s writings, a point he has quite forcefully made. The other point is that the very notion of this reality being inaccessible through science means that we cannot say anything about it from this perspective. D’Espagnat does speculate that it is of a form that exists outside of space and time based on quantum entanglement, but it is not a position that I am able to defend adequately, and it was a mistake on my part to imply that this ultimate reality is of such a form – such comments, even when derived by d’Espagnat, can obviously only be of a philosophical nature. The last point concerns your valid comment regarding the difference between macroscopic and microscopic reality. I would say that the notion of counterfactuality that makes the distinction. Within macroscopic reality, counterfactuality holds. At the microscopic level, it (according to d’Espagnat) breaks down. This aspect of counterfactuality is discussed below.

In terms of this notion of ultimate reality, it really hinges on how much of an impact you think the observer has on scientific reality. If we consider that we cannot actually separate nature, the apparatus and the observer, and that the observer is more than just a superficial, passive presence, but rather it is of fundamental importance in terms of what results from the observer/apparatus/nature combination to give our scientific reality. This being the case, the question is, how can we access nature without incurring this active observer part of the combination? How do we examine nature as it exists outside of the combination? Failure to achieve this doesn’t invalidate science at all in my opinion, it just places science in a context whereby it can be understood that at all times the reality that we perceive is the combination, not nature at it’s most fundamental, which in my opinion, is that which exists outside of the combination.

The question for me was (and still is) , is the formulation of this notion of ultimate reality only a philosophical construct (and as far as I understand was first proposed by Kant, and is nothing new in philosophical circles) or is there a scientific basis to it? If it was purely philosophical in nature then perhaps it would be easier to discount from the perspective that you bring – I’m not sure. But what does strike me about d’Espagnat’s thesis is that he uses the science of quantum mechanics to strengthen the position that says the observer is more than just a passive (or superficially) active ingredient, he uses the whole area of quantum mechanics in which to give scientific backing to this claim that the observer is much more than a passive observer that may perhaps distort what exists at the most fundamental level and so render us with some approximation of what exists there (I believe Einstein thought this to be the case, there is a quote somewhere on this forum that encapsulates it nicely in terms of a watch and the mechanism inside).

The stance that d’Espagnat takes is to consider counterfactuality, and this is what he says:

Schematically, I make a counterfactual reasoning when I say to myself: “by performing such and such an operation (for example, going and seeing) I found that such and such a quantity has such and such a value, even if I had not performed the operation in question”. Counterfactuality enables us to trust the validity of some statements referring to an observation or an action that we could perform instead of the one we actually do.

It is this notion of counterfactuality that according to d’Espagnat breaks down at the quantum level in terms of experiments, not theory. He thus arrives at (his) definition of the quantum formalism which is that quantum physics predicts observations not events, it does not predict something to have intrinsic properties independently of the observer. Without the observation, the formalism is incomplete.
He encapsulates this in terms of weak objectivity, which he formally defines as:

A statement is “weakly objective” when it implies (directly or indirectly) the notion of an observer but is of a form (or occurs in such a context) that it implicitly claims to be true for any observer whatsoever.

So the question is, to what extent is the observer an important notion within science? At the quantum level, it seems that counterfactuality breaks down thus rendering the observer as fundamental as the apparatus and nature, establishing the notion that objectivity at this level is of a weak form. He uses this as a basis for constructing an empirical reality that restores counterfactuality via decoherence theory along with considering that the quantum formalism has shown (Brune et al. 1996) that it is universal in nature. By this he claims that the predictive rules of classical mechanics and the rest of physics follow from those of quantum mechanics.

As best as I can understand, quantum mechanics illustrates that the observer defines the reality rather that being a passive observer which, on the basis of d’Espagnat’s work in terms of our macroscopic reality suggests that the difference between ultimate reality that exists outside of any observation and empirical reality is of a nature that does not follow counterfactuality, in other words it cannot be thought of as being a distorted or approximate picture, affected by our senses in a passive manner, we can have no such preconceptions because of the breakdown of counterfactuality that is shown to happen through quantum mechanics.

So that’s the outline, I am persuaded in principle by d’Espagnat, but there is a lot of detail in his thesis, too much for me to take on board in terms of defending his stance. I can certainly see where you are coming from in that although we may agree that the observer, the apparatus and nature are an entwined entity, what you would say is that this shouldn’t prevent us as observers obtaining an approximate understanding of ultimate nature on the basis that although the effect of the observer cannot be removed, that effect may not be sufficient in which to prevent us from saying that the reality we perceive is of the same approximate form as would exist without the observer. I hope you can see how this view differs from d’Espagnat’s argument (based on the breakdown of counterfactuality at the quantum level) concerning the importance of the observer.

I would be interested in any comments that would refute this breakdown of counterfactuality, given that this seems to be a key feature of his thesis – I certainly have no agenda one way or the other, only a continuing sense of puzzlement over what science can and cannot tell us about nature. For me (personally) d’Espagnat (and Ken G on this forum) have gone a long way in placing science within some kind of context in terms of this question that does make sense to me in an accessible manner.

[Coldcreation]

CC

I think the fundamental disagreement between us really rests with your stance as a physical realist, and indeed, as I mentioned, d’Espagnat’s writings are really an attack on this position...

[...]

I would be interested in any comments that would refute this breakdown of counterfactuality, given that this seems to be a key feature of his thesis...

Thanks for your response Len Moran.

Before tackling the good points above [and in between], let me finish posting the responses to your other post (from the design thread). There may even pop up some arguments related to the points in your last post. But, either way, I will take the time to go over in detail and clear up any issues that need clarification before diving into the 'unknown' (the breakdown of counterfactuality). It may take two or three more posts.


Continued from post #5:

My point is that (from the perspective I outline) nature at its most fundamental escapes scientific investigation and hence contradicts your central premise that I outlined at the start of this post, in other words, there is an essential aspect of the physical world that can never, even in principle, be accessed by science, it is a reality that lay outside of our entwined observer/nature interpretation of the world. This means that questions of a creator/designer/God or whatever term anyone may wish to use cannot be refuted at all by science in the manner you thesis claims. Now this may be overstepping the mark on my part in that I use the terms design/God/creator in a very general sense associated with the very beginnings of nature within the context of the inaccessible reality I have been describing.

From the point of view that the laws of physics are universal, both locally and globally, it can be assumed that the same laws are operational at scales compatible with fundamental particles (or waves, or both, or neither ), or at even smaller scales (if there are any).

As mentioned above, science can and does live with dualities. They are a given, physically, accepted, and even welcomed, not just because they are observed at both macro- and microscopic scales, but because they are part of our everyday experience.

From a scientific perspective the physical world preserves the duality of mind and matter, spirit and nature, observable and invisible. This could also be articulated in different ways, through a chain of associations: wave and corpuscle, velocity and position, vacuum field and angular momentum, mass and energy, time and space, real and imaginary, internal and external world, individual and universal. And there are more of those associations one might call poles apart, or diametrically opposed antitheses, or even equivalences: objective and subjective, rational and irrational, life and death, past and future, constructive and destructive, voluntary and involuntary, pole and non-pole. Some might call the divide between them a continuum, thus there is flux that allows the transforming of one to the other.

Einstein believed that science could be a complete material and visual embodiment of the 'truth,' that the state of a system may well be specified directly, freed from arbitrariness, and that only then could the invalidation of duality be finally realized. The solution lay for him in the path of a relativistic field theory. It was this that gave him the incentive for moving ‘outwards’ from quantum mechanics and its uncertainty or indeterminacy, into the development of unified theory: he wanted to make the ideal a reality not just in theory but in nature as a whole.

Einstein had seen science in terms of these major polarities, and drafted a concept that he believed was to end in their unification, but had not been able to find out whether his ‘natural’ generalized law could stand up “against the facts of experience.” It's not surprising in this context that a consistent quantum theory of gravity remains one of the most (if not the most) important challenges to theoretical physicists.

_______________

The laws of nature are both simple and complex. They deal with certitudes and probabilities, with reversible and irreversible phenomena. They describe a universe of asymmetrical and chaotic motions, of equilibrium configurations and quasi-stable orbits. This order and disorder represents both quantum and macroscopic systems. They open the way to an evolutionary description of things present in spacetime, from waves to particles, DNA to living organisms, from gravity fields to massive bodies, from the formation of galaxies and superclusters to the structure and evolution of the entire universe.

In my opinion, there are no essential aspect of the physical world that cannot (even in principle) be accessed by science. There is no reality that lay outside of our entwined observer/nature interpretation of the world that cannot be identified (at least in principle), even if it can't be proved. The fact that we can think about the unknown (e.g., 21 dimensions, god) doesn't mean we can prove mathematically the existence or nonexistence of such, but we sure do come up with qualitative (and sometimes quantitative) arguments about them.

My opinion [more related to the design thread] is that questions of a creator, designer, god (or whatever), can and should be refuted by science; contrary to the claim implicit in your (or d'Espagnat's) thesis [which you have since clarified in post #8 above]: since there are, in many cases, qualitative or conceptual solutions that do explain the 'unknowable.'

The case of god is different; it differs little from most ATM ideas. This of course would not be meant to stop people from believing or having faith in whatever they like. Au contraire.

Your theme in this thread [Is there design in the universe?], as you say, has been to relate design to directly or indirectly observables within our macroscopic reality such as stars, galaxies, DNA etc. But as I stated earlier in this post, I take your theme as using science to refute generally the notion of design and a creator, it just so happens that within the context of your thesis, by default, your arguments would be applicable to any aspect of design or supernatural creation since you see “observables” as being in essence that which can be inferred directly or indirectly through science right down to nature at it's most fundamental level.

That interpretation would be correct.


To be continued...


CC

[Cougar]

Is there a picture of nature that science builds (or could build) that might actually be a true representation of physical reality?

This is not a pipe....

[Coldcreation]

This is not a pipe....

Nice Cougar.

You knew I'd like that.

Artists, like scientists, create innovative ideas based on information and amalgamation. Only through research, analyses, syntheses, imagination and intuition, can one hope to discover something new, as Magritte (your link) in the arts, along with many others, such as Marcel Duchamp. And, there are other tight correlations between science and art:

The creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his contribution to the creative act. (Duchamp, 1957)

Of course, the inspiration generated by scientists must be tested empirically to find out whether there is agreement with nature’s methods, or whether it is the immaterial (sometimes irrelevant) construct of the imagination. Arguably, quantum mechanics and the breakdown of counterfactuality, was presented as a flat mirror held up to the universe: but it did not reflect, it was transparent, with its own properties, hidden from view. As an aperture out of the mind's eye, QM, so it seemed, could only be a refusal of the fundamental characteristics of nature, just as Dada art was liberated from material properties and constraints. It is impossible to envision a world-model as being other than a window with a view: but the first concern then is to know what it looks out on.

This kind of game-playing with contradictory codes for the representation of nature is not solely restricted to the fine-arts. This has become one of the most ubiquitous devices used in theoretical physics. Such a development represents unambiguously an expansion of possibilities, an expansion of scope, which at first glance may not seem inconsistent with the processes of the scientific method. Yet, such pictorial codes by which theories can be denoted raises ambiguities that emerge when these conflicting codes are pitched one against the other—locked into an aesthetic game whose rules the artist controls.

I could be wrong but it seems d'Espagnat, like Magritte, and like Duchamp, may be linking the imagination to the hand while bypassing the eye.


CC

[Len Moran]

CC

It thought it may be useful if I just make a brief list of what seem to be some points from your posts 2,4,5 and 9 and comment on them because I think they all relate to the important difference between our perspectives that involve the notion of the observer. Please note that although I have generally copied your remarks, they are not to be taken as quotes, so apologies for any misrepresentations on my part.


Laws (as I interpret your stance)

1. The laws that are operational at the macroscopic level are also operational with fundamental particles.
2. There are no limitations to what we can conceive or imagine using these universal laws.
3. There does not exist two different realities, one macroscopic the other veiled. The same fundamental laws cover all of reality
4. There is no reality that lay outside of our entwined observer/nature representation that cannot be identified (at least in principle) even if it can’t be proved using universal laws

My response:

1.The laws you talk of I would consider to be laws relating to empirical reality. Our observation of fundamental particles rely on macroscopic traces and detectors and are macroscopic observations which will follow laws of empirical science.
2. What we imagine, is a hypothetical empirical reality using laws that we know are valid within empirical reality.
3. The same fundamental laws cover all of empirical reality, a reality that includes as as observers.
4. We could only identify it if we are sure that such a reality that exists outside of our involvement is of the same form. How can we be sure of that? All our verifiable science is carried out in terms of empirical observation.

The point here is that we have to be clear what our laws of empirical reality represent, do they represent nature outside of our involvement? How can we find the answer to such a question?


Duality etc. (as I interpret your stance)


1. Duality can be invalidated through science drilling down to the deepest levels resulting in more fundamental explanations.
2. We need to live with whether an electron is a particle or wave, or other dualities may be for ever, but we don’t need to think of them as a key to understanding ultimate reality.

My response:

I simply think of these aspects as models which are a human representation of ultimate reality. I don’t consider resolving their contradictions (particle/wave) to be a key to understanding ultimate reality; they are predictive models that are valid within their domains of applicability, that’s all that can be said of them. That we may forever have to think of an electron as a particle or wave is of no real consequence to me.

Macroscopic reality (as I interpret your stance)


1. Macroscopic reality is not the only reality that exists, since we observe things and events of the microscopic world. This is a reality that is broadly the same form with or without our involvement.
2. Macroscopic reality is not a human representation of a more fundamental reality and it is the same form as fundamental reality.
3. Things that are not accessible to observation form part of the same fundamental reality as things observed macroscopically.
4. Information gained from study of macro and micro is used to construct models that accurately represent the natural world.

My response:

1. We observe the microscopic world indirectly through macroscopic detectors, we never actually see a particle.
2. How can we know that macroscopic reality – our observed reality - is of the same form as fundamental reality that exists outside of any observation?
3. No one has ever seen a photon in flight; in fact no field has ever deflected a photon in flight in vacuum. The reality of photons only becomes apparent to us through empirical observation at the source and sink, the bit in between doesn’t seem to follow any aspect of macroscopic observation. What the fundamental reality that gives rise to photons is (I think) one of the deepest questions we can ask. I am not sure what evidence can be cited to say that photons in flight are part of our macroscopic reality. Our macroscopic reality is only applicable to the source and detector.
4. The models we construct are human representations that accurately predict observations of our macroscopic reality within the valid remit of that model.


It does seem to be the case, (based on the above) that:

1. I consider the observer as being fundamental to the outcomes of science.
2. You do not consider the observer to be fundamental to the outcomes of science.
3. I consider that the reality that exists outside of our involvement is not of the same form as our macroscopic reality.
4. You do not consider (3) to be the case because our observations do little to interfere with what we observe in any manner, therefore a reality that exists outside of our observations will be basically of the same form as that which exists within our observation.
5. d’Espagnat considers that the breakdown of counterfactuality at the quantum level refutes your premise in (4).

The basic disagreement between us I think simply concerns the role of the observer. The real question is how can we establish the degree to which the observer is important? D’Espagnat thinks he can establish it (as far as I can tell) fundamentally through the breakdown of counterfactuality, and extending the consequences of that (through decoherence) to our macroscopic world.

[Coldcreation]

Continued from post #9:

In conclusion I would say that for me, what science cannot tell us about nature is as important as what it can and does tell us. I consider that there are some very powerful (primarily scientific) arguments within d’Espagnat’s writings that give rise to a notion of reality that cannot be accessed by science, a notion that places (for me) science within its proper perspective and with a remit that does not allow any kind of scientific refutation of supernatural design. So to answer your question, I think there is a link between d'Espagnat's writings and your conception of design, but it rests upon taking a choice between two philosophical stances, one of ontological or physical realism and the other of a more "open" realism" in the manner that d'Espagnat holds. The former represents (I would say) your position, the latter mine.

Again, with due respect, I disagree with you position. But at least I feel we're speaking the same language: what differs is the interpretations given to the subject matter (or the lack of subject matter ).

To widen the scope of discussion to include an aspect of nature called consciousness (not just as something that interferes with QM experiments), the late Ilya Prigogine, with whom I'm sure you and d'Espagnat are familiar, showed that “human creativity and innovation can be understood as the amplification of laws of nature already present in physics or chemistry” (Prigogine,1996, The End of Certainty, Time Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature, p. 71).

Prigogine also pointed out that the time-ordered flow of long-range correlations in far-from-equilibrium conditions (as seen in biological systems) is a valuable and provocative analogy to human communication. “When two people meet, they converse, and consequently modify their thinking to some extent. These modifications are brought to subsequent meetings, and modified further,” a phenomenon called dissemination. “There is a flow of communication in society, just as there is a flow of correlations in matter” (1996, p. 79).

The idea is interesting that consciousness is likely to affect and/or be affected by somebody or something in the environment⎯just like the influences that occur when gravitational fields of two or more massive bodies interact, or like the interaction and bifurcations of particles in the Feynman drawings. If Prigogine’s analysis is not consistent without the completion of such an ambitious agenda, then it loses breadth and depth of the scope, but not simplicity, which at first glance is what made his analysis attractive. Although I'm pretty certain he was aware of the universality of such a claim (as implied below).

The problem of measurement that Prigogine referred to on many occasions dealt with the subjective aspect of quantum theory; which ascribes an unreasonable role to the observer. He also dealt extensively with the problem of irreversibility and how it related to the very foundation of thermodynamic systems in the evolutionary description connected with the increase of entropy with time, a phenomenon described by the second law of thermodynamics.

Additionally, Prigogine expressed the view-point, not dissimilar to d'Espagnat's view, and others alike, that ”the laws of physics describe an idealized world that is quite different from the unstable, evolving world in which we live…we can no longer associate the arrow of time only with an increase of disorder. Recent developments in nonequilibrium physics and chemistry point in the opposite direction. They show unambiguously that the arrow of time is a source of order…Irreversibility leads to both order and disorder…they do not correspond to approximations added to the basic laws. Irreversible processes play a fundamental constructive role in nature.” (1996, p. 26) And that interacting fields lead to resonance patterns that “wander erratically” through regions of space, increasing entropy, leading to long-range correlations, chaos and the breaking of time symmetry—irreversibly—that acts over very long time-scales and that profoundly alter the macroscopic state of the system. And that dynamic fluctuations, a basic property of nature, lead to instability and provides the conditions required to generate evolutionary relationships.

Long-range correlations sometime go well beyond the immediate surroundings, extending through complex groups of individuals. This phenomenon is seen in Bose-Einstein condensates, superfluids, superconduction, chemical reactions, tornados, hurricanes, galaxies, clusters, superclusters and in all biological life forms. This is what Prigogine was hinting at.

The following quote exemplifies the idea (or interpretation) that nature at its most fundamental level (essential for our understanding of nature) may not be that of individual particles or waves, but a more general level that included macroscopic systems:

“…phase transitions are ultimately defined by the thermodynamic limit…Phase transitions correspond to emerging properties. They are meaningful only at the level of populations, and not single particles. This contention is somewhat analogous to that which is based on Poincaré resonances. Persistent interactions mean that we cannot take a part of the system and consider it in isolation. It is at this global level, at the level of populations, that the symmetry between past and future is broken, and science can recognize the flow of time. This solves a long-standing puzzle. It is indeed in macroscopic physics that irreversibility and probability are the most conspicuous.” (Prigogine, 1996, p. 45).

Both the former and the latter leads me to believe that the most fundamental aspect of nature (what you call "nature at its most fundamental level" or ultimate reality) is not solely located in the veiled realm of QM, but too in the macroscopic realm, a domain to which we do have direct empirical access.

As Prigogine highlights further, “It is remarkable that irreversibility already emerges in simple situations involving only a few degrees of freedom.” [...] “This, of course, is a blow to the anthropomorphic interpretation of irreversibility based on approximations that we ourselves are supposed to introduce.”

Ilya Prigogine wrote we are at the beginning of a new scientific era, not just limited to simplified situations, but reflective of the complexity, of the real world, “a science that views us and our creativity as part of a fundamental trend present at all levels of nature” (1996 p.7), and that as mentioned above; “human creativity and innovation can be understood as the amplification of laws of nature already present in physics or chemistry” (1996, p. 71).

There are reasons why consciousness should be interpreted as a physical phenomenon (within the purview of science). If it were not, we would be obliged to curtail the range of validity of both quantum and relativistic dynamics, not to mention the natural laws⎯especially in view of the fact that the behavior of macroscopic and microscopic systems (between which life happens to be flanked) are entirely based upon these directive postulates and principles.


What makes these remarks important, in opposition to glossolalic babbling, is that we human beings are far-from-equilibrium dynamical systems⎯a nice comparison can be made to interactions at the QM level, if one is impelled to so. What interests me most, without going into a lengthy discourse, are the dissipative processes, long-range correlations, time asymmetry and new coherences that dynamical non-equilibrium allows. It is well known⎯with expressed gratitude towards Ilya Prigogine for having shed light on the subject⎯that dynamical instability provides conditions necessary to generate evolutionary patterns of nature. Moreover, we are beginning to understand the dynamical source of organization, the emergence of complexity and irreversible dissipative structures at the macroscopic level⎯essential in processes of self-organization and the emergence of life (Prigogine, 1996, pp. 127-128)

I would personally extend this line of thinking to a breadth and depth of the scope that includes all that exists, the essence of the physical universe and it's evolution in time. One of the accomplishments of this generality (if one considers it universal, as I do) is that it eliminates the need for 'something more.' It eliminates the need for and intelligent designer, design with intent (whatever its source), it eliminates the need for god by doing away with the gap: where He would otherwise have been infused.


These are some of the reasons why I think nature at its most fundamental level may not be solely located in the hidden realm that d'Espagnat points to. These are some of the reasons why I think nature at its most fundamental level can be observed in a wide variety of situations, events, scales and phenomena.

To be continued...


CC

[ToSeek]

Moved from Q&A to Science and Technology since it's more of a discussion topic than a question with a straightforward mainstream answer.

[Jens]

After Real World Records of course.

Totally. I may have had some disagreements with you in the thread on meaning, but here we agree!

I'm not sure if this is what you are really trying to discuss, but my initial thought on seeing the title of the thread is, of course not. To completely represent the physical world, you would need as much data as the physical world has, so the representation would have to be the physical world itself. You could never even fully understand the physical world, because this would require being the physical world in a sense, since you would need as much data.

But maybe you are thinking of something slightly different.

[Ken G]

In terms of this notion of ultimate reality, it really hinges on how much of an impact you think the observer has on scientific reality. If we consider that we cannot actually separate nature, the apparatus and the observer, and that the observer is more than just a superficial, passive presence, but rather it is of fundamental importance in terms of what results from the observer/apparatus/nature combination to give our scientific reality. This being the case, the question is, how can we access nature without incurring this active observer part of the combination? How do we examine nature as it exists outside of the combination? Failure to achieve this doesn’t invalidate science at all in my opinion, it just places science in a context whereby it can be understood that at all times the reality that we perceive is the combination, not nature at it’s most fundamental, which in my opinion, is that which exists outside of the combination.

Yes, I think that sums it up quite well. Weak objectivity is not a bug of science, it is a feature-- it is part of the very definition of science. We were mistaken to ever imagine that science should or could be anything but a weakly objective endeavor, and all quantum mechanics did was give us our wakeup call on an issue we should have recognized already: science is a conversation with nature, and we are not only in that conversation, we are supposed to be in that conversation.

[Coldcreation]

Continued from post #13:



To state my position perhaps over-simply; there is no guarantee that the realm of nature inaccessible to our direct observation (either at great distances or at microscopic scale) represents anything more than another aspect of nature to be considered (or not) in the continuum of things. At all scales and all degrees of complexity there are aspects of nature equally, if not more, important to the understanding of the whole picture of physical reality as there are likely at inaccessible scales. Science should not be hindered by 'missing links' in this regard, just as science is not hindered greatly by the missing links in the fossil record in drawing an accurate picture of the evolution of life on earth. And just like cosmology is not greatly hindered by the visual horizon in the formulation of a standard model that describes the evolution of the physical universe.

In sum, the stance here is that nature at all levels (or all scales) is fundamentally important to our understanding of the physical world. No parcel of this continuum is more or less important than the other. The question is what to do with the gaps (especially down on the subatomic scale). They should not be ignored. That is for sure.


Secondly, the idea that gaps in our understanding (due to the impossibility of exploring certain parts of nature) leave open the possibility that there exists either other dimensions, another realm of nature that will remain incomprehensible, an aspect of nature not available to our senses, experience, or empirical observation (mirco- and/or macroscopically) that prevents us from gaining knowledge of "nature at it’s most fundamental level" and thereby preventing us from drawing a picture that would be a close approximation of how nature works is not an argument based on a sound rationale. This is what creationist and ID proponents have jumped on, as a kind of scientific bandwagon: where the gap is filled with a supernatural/metaphysical entity/force.

An analogy, not unrelated: Even with species missing from the fossil record we are still able to draw a consistent and accurate picture of the evolution of life on earth. This is not a complete picture, by any means, but the incompleteness has not lead to the overall failure of evolution theory. Fortunately, what we do know has resulted in quite the contrary.


Finally, the idea that science is limited in this sense and no longer the domain of purview within which investigations should be carried out conceptually or qualitatively (since a quantitative or empirical bases of investigation seems beyond reach or ruled out), and that therefor philosophy and/or theology should take over where science⎯looking back at the incoming runner and holding out a baton to an open Hand⎯leaves off, in not justified by our actual knowledge of physics. There is no reason to assume knowledge cannot be gained (now or at some time in the future) through inference determined by results based on direct or indirect evidence that issues from calculated experiments consistent withe the scientific method. The knowledge should constitute a coherent all-inclusive representation of the world not accessible through observation, or a way of dealing with it directly or indirectly.


In Einstein’s words, “Pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world; all knowledge of reality starts from experience and ends in it.”

I disagree, as Einstein had for decades, with statements made by Niels Bohr that “an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explain our own conscious activity.” Bohr’s views on the limitations of knowledge and explanation have dominated physics for more than a generation—without them though, perhaps, the whole of physics would have been boring (Not ).

The bulk of my argument and its culmination here, I suppose, aims at bridging the divide between the knowable and the unknowable, between what is observed and not observed, between two continents that began diverging exponentially from the late 1920s onward: In order to mend the rift a limitation must be acknowledged (and is), not a radical limitation on the scope of human knowledge, but a conservative one that is both mutually relevant and inclusive to all aspects of existence, one that all things share communally, present everywhere, and that unites the large and the small, the local and the global, relativity and quantum mechanics, and yes, even physics and consciousness.


Relevant to some extent with the topic of this thread are the following words, dated 1936, (the year of the Olympic games in Berlin, where two American sprinters, the only two Jews on the U.S. Olympic team, were pulled from the 4 × 100 relay team on the day of the competition: no baton for them: ), entitled Quantum Theory and the Fundamentals of Physics:

“Probably never before has a theory been evolved which has given a key to the interpretation and calculation of such a heterogeneous group of phenomena of experience as has quantum mechanics. In spite of this, I believe that the theory is apt to beguile us into error in our search for a uniform basis for physics, because, in my belief, it is an incomplete representation of real things, although it is the only one which can be built out of the fundamental concepts of force and material points (quantum corrections to classical mechanics). The incompleteness of the representation leads necessarily to the statistical nature (incompleteness) of the laws. It is conceivable that human ingenuity will some day find methods which will make it possible to proceed along such a path. At the present time, however, such a program looks like an attempt to breathe in empty space.” (Einstein, see 1954, 1982 Ideas and Opinions, pp. 315, 316, 319).

Only Einstein was able to direct cosmic religious means to ends that were both his and attuned to both religious and scientific conviction; and he, as everyone knows, stood apart. Perhaps the most telling indication was Einstein’s inclination to look upon science and religion as irreconcilable antagonists and for very obvious reasons. “The man who is thoroughly convinced of the universal operation of the law of causation cannot for a moment entertain the idea of a being who interferes in the course of events.” In a 1939 address at Princeton Einstein advocated; “science can only ascertain what is, not what should be, and outside of its domain value judgments of all kind remain necessary. Religion on the other hand, deals only with evaluations of human thought and action: it cannot justifiably speak of facts and relationships between facts” (see Einstein, 1954, 1982, pp. 41-49).

Okay, enough appealing to authority already!

Well actually, Herr Albert did have something else to say, that I wholly agree with, first about GR, then about QM. Einstein’s stance was straightforward:

The abandonment of certain notions connected with space, time, and motion hitherto treated as fundamentals must not be regarded as arbitrary, but only as conditioned by observed facts.” (Einstein 1921, see 1954). [GR is a class of “principle-theories” as its inventor called them] “These employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their basis and starting-point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria…” (1919, see 1954). “If the basis of theoretical physics cannot be an inference from experience, but must be a free invention, have we any right to hope that we shall find the correct way? Still more—does this correct approach exist at all, save in our imaginations? To this I answer with complete assurance, that in my opinion there is a correct path. Moreover, that it is in our power to find it.” (Einstein 1919, Ideas and Opinions 1954).

As mentioned above, we homosapiens are far-from-equilibrium dynamical systems ourselves (with both marco- and microscopic characteristics). We likely possess in our very being (in our consciousness even) many (if not all) the attributes and properties inherent in QM interactions. That doesn't necessarily imply that we should be able to understand every aspect of QM, or eliminate the unknown from QM, any more than we should be able understand or remove the transcendental nature of Pi or π, but it probably helps.

"If you wish to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe"
(Carl Sagan, Cosmos)


_________

As a final note, related more to arguments made in the "design" thread about filling in the gaps related to science (and particularly QM), I would like to introduce a post written in a similar context, in a similar forum, by a friend of mine. It fits in perfectly with that issue [though this is not Len Moran's stated position]. With his permission, I post it here in slightly modified-form:

Douglas Adams said "Isn't it enough to see that a garden is beautiful without having to believe that there are fairies at the bottom of it too?". The answer, of course, depends on the person. To some people the garden is more beautiful when inhabited with imaginary creatures. To some people the reality of the garden is awe inspiring even if not so inhabited. Einstein's position is stated eloquently [see "The situation may be expressed by an image: science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind.", but is essentially nothing more than deciding to consider the garden a fairy because it is so miraculous and wonderful.

Maybe there's utility in that kind of thinking and maybe it's an improvement on what "fairy" means and what it means to "believe in fairies". But, what it does not do is answer Adams' question. Instead of answering the difficult questions that design or religion brings such as "is there a designer" or "is there a god" it redefines design and religion in an easily answerable way. "This rock is part of God; this rock exists; therefore God exists". That's fine, but some people really want to know if (or really believe that) there are fairies under the garden. To them the fairy is not the garden. To them a fairy is a fairy and a garden is a garden. I respect that for its straightforwardness.

~modest

So, when the question arises: Is there design in the universe? The answer is NO.

And to the question: Can science build an accurate representation of the physical world? The answer is YES.


Barcelona, Spain, October 30, and 8 November 2009

Coldcreation

[mugaliens]

So it seems your answer is yes for some things, and no for others. What about for the topic of this thread?

CC

Topic of this thread: "Can science build an accurate representation of the physical world?"

My answer: "No. It can approximate it, and for some things quite well, but for dyanamic systems (i.e. weather), only for limited durations of time before reality diverges from the predicted model."

Coldcreation, when you pose questions, you will get answers. If you don't like the answers, I would recommend you pose different questions.

[Coldcreation]

Topic of this thread: "Can science build an accurate representation of the physical world?"

My answer: "No. It can approximate it, and for some things quite well, but for dyanamic systems (i.e. weather), only for limited durations of time before reality diverges from the predicted model."

Coldcreation, when you pose questions, you will get answers. If you don't like the answers, I would recommend you pose different questions.

I find answers quite interesting (more so than questions), yours included.

Thanks for clarifying your point.

Are you saying that a predicted model, such as one that would describe the universe (a dynamical system), or nature in general (a series of dynamical systems and subsystems), cannot be approximated because, like the weather, after limited durations of time, "reality" would diverges in excess of an acceptable value from the predicted model? And that therefor, the model, or world-view would fail?

Your answer leaves open a related question: to what quantitative or qualitative extent would an approximation qualify as acceptable, when the goal is to build an accurate representation of the physical world?

CC

[Ken G]

So, when the question arises: Is there design in the universe? The answer is NO.

And to the question: Can science build an accurate representation of the physical world? The answer is YES.

All questions require interpretation before they have answers. The first question, or the metaquestion, is always, "what interpretation makes this question interesting, and what interpretation makes it pointless to even ask?" You have chosen what I would call a pointless interpretation of those questions, then gave the obvious answer that the pointless interpretation provides. You, and ~modest, interpret the question "is there design" as "is there a designer", which as we all know is a scientifically sterile question. Ask a sterile question, get a sterile answer.

I would argue that more interesting interpretations of the design question provides the opposite answer. A more interesting interpretation of the presence of design is the presence of something is simpler, more elegant, more symmetric, more parsimonious, more efficient, than we might otherwise have expected. No reference to any designer, which is outside science anyway. That is a more interesting interpretation, because it begins to tell us something interesting about the entire endeavor that is scientific inquiry.

Also, a more interesting interpretation of how well science can accurately represent reality points out that the job of science is not to know reality, that is viewed by science as an impossible task. Instead, the job of science is to replace reality with something simpler, something that throws out what we have decided not to care about and focus only on what we deem important, something that we then call a "model." Not only will no model ever be the same thing as reality, it will never be supposed to be the same thing as reality. But the answer can still be "yes" as long as we recognize that "accurately represent" means nothing more than "make a useful model of."

[Coldcreation]

All questions require interpretation before they have answers [...] No reference to any designer, which is outside science anyway.

Hello again Ken G. In my last post in the design thread you will find a response to the above, including remarks about the idea that there is a difference design a la natural and design a la supernatural, too, between design and a designer, but that they both lead to the same conclusion: the untenable nature of the metaphysical core.

Also, a more interesting interpretation of how well science can accurately represent reality points out that the job of science is not to know reality, that is viewed by science as an impossible task. Instead, the job of science is to replace reality with something simpler, something that throws out what we have decided not to care about and focus only on what we deem important, something that we then call a "model." Not only will no model ever be the same thing as reality, it will never be supposed to be the same thing as reality. But the answer can still be "yes" as long as we recognize that "accurately represent" means nothing more than "make a useful model of."

Actually I agree with what you write about 'reality.' That is a term that Len Moran has been using, based on d'Espagnat's thesis. That was pointed out at the start of the OP. I have use the term very little and very loosely so far in this thread. I'll look into exactly what d'Espagnat has to say about the topic of reality in the context of his 2003, Veiled Reality: An Analysis of Quantum Mechanical Concepts).

The question-title of this thread uses the term physical world, as in universe, or nature generally. (Not physical reality, or real world, for the very reason you point to above)

Good point also about the terms 'accurate representation.'

In one of the next few posts you will find an elaboration on these points, and more.

CC

[Ken G]

Hello again Ken G. In my last post in the design thread you will find a response to the above, including remarks about the idea that there is a difference design a la natural and design a la supernatural, too, between design and a designer, but that they both lead to the same conclusion: the untenable nature of the metaphysical core.

The instant you refer to a designer, your response is irrelevant to the issues of design that I am talking about. It doesn't matter what you say about the concept of a designer, any such concept is scientifically irrelevant, including whether or not there is one.

The question-title of this thread uses the term physical world, as in universe, or nature generally. (Not physical reality, or real world, for the very reason you point to above)

It sounds to me like the replacement of "reality" with "physical world" is essentially defining what you are talking about as being whatever the scientific method is effective in describing. This renders circular the question, which now becomes, "can science accurately represent whatever it is that science is effective in describing?" That's what I mean by a pointless interpretation of the question, the answer follows directly without any metaphysical thought. I think that is your goal, to show that such questions can be answered without metaphysics, but you only accomplish that by virtue of a circular argument. If you ask a question that is actually metaphysical, then the answer must necessarily be metaphysical.

[gzhpcu]

Isn't it just a matter of scale regarding the understanding of the physical world? As equipment to extend our senses improves the scope of our model increases, but we will never be able to reach the Planck scale at the low end or the entire universe at the other end of the scale. We would need a collider the length of the Milky Way at least to explore the Planck length. We can only make guesses regarding the inaccessible scales, and if they somehow tie in with our scales, so much the better, but we still will not definitely know for sure. We have a bandwith of understanding which can be sharp and clear, but when we reach the boundaries, our understanding becomes increasingly fuzzy...

[Coldcreation]

The instant you refer to a designer, your response is irrelevant to the issues of design that I am talking about. It doesn't matter what you say about the concept of a designer, any such concept is scientifically irrelevant, including whether or not there is one.

I agree that the concept of a designer is scientifically irrelevant, but I would add too that the concept of design as you have described it is also scientifically irrelevant. I explain why here... and in the post that follows, here. I haven't seen any rebuttal yet on your part related to those posts. If I am mistaken about the concept of "design" feel free to respond in that thread which is specifically on that topic.

It sounds to me like the replacement of "reality" with "physical world" is essentially defining what you are talking about as being whatever the scientific method is effective in describing.

There is no replacement of "reality" with "physical world."

I chose the terms used in the question precisely to avoid any misunderstandings, of the type you convey (that are intrinsic to the word "reality"). This is a word used by d'Espagnat. And I'm sure I will understand his context when I get to reading more of his work.

Until then, I don't mind using the word in exchanges where the term is used.

This renders circular the question, which now becomes, "can science accurately represent whatever it is that science is effective in describing?" That's what I mean by a pointless interpretation of the question, the answer follows directly without any metaphysical thought. I think that is your goal, to show that such questions can be answered without metaphysics, but you only accomplish that by virtue of a circular argument. If you ask a question that is actually metaphysical, then the answer must necessarily be metaphysical.

I don't think that would be the most fruitful interpretation of the question. Of course you are free to do so. If you look, though, closely you will see that it is noncircular (or that circularity can be bypassed).

Observe from this perspective, if you prefer:

Can we understand nature? Can we understand enough to form a viable model that describes it (to some extent accurately and objectively)? Or, is that goal unattainable?

Think of it in terms too of what is missing from the question but implicit (see the OP for related questions):

Can human beings gain knowledge about that which is not directly observable, e.g., in the subatomic realm?


These and the OP questions are the issue here under scrutiny: Not how the English language can be put to better use by asking different yet interesting questions, or how the English language can be manipulated in such a way as to transform the initial intention of a question (or something like that). Sure, questions, like answers, can be interpreted in a variety of different ways.

Really, the aim here is to answer the questions intended, if that is at all possible.

It should be interesting in any case...


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[Ken G]

Isn't it just a matter of scale regarding the understanding of the physical world? As equipment to extend our senses improves the scope of our model increases, but we will never be able to reach the Planck scale at the low end or the entire universe at the other end of the scale.

There is certainly that limitation, but there is more to it than just the issue of scale. Notice an implicit assumption that your question makes-- you are assuming that the only barrier to successfully characterizing everything that contributes to our reality is the scale of the observation. What about the rules of observation themselves, what limitations do they pose? When did it become a valid assumption that we could, even in principle, scientifically observe a great poem or the moment of childbirth, in such a way that captured the very essence of those realities?

We can certainly observe the words of a poem, or the fact that a childbirth has occured, but is our only limitation there a sense of scale, or accuracy? I say that we too often overlook the fact that we have entered into a particular way of looking at things when we adopt the approach of scientific observation. That way is quite powerful for what it does for us, and that's why we enter into it, but being powerful and being all-inclusive are two very different things. The very question in the OP falls victim to conflating these differences.

We would need a collider the length of the Milky Way at least to explore the Planck length. We can only make guesses regarding the inaccessible scales, and if they somehow tie in with our scales, so much the better, but we still will not definitely know for sure. We have a bandwith of understanding which can be sharp and clear, but when we reach the boundaries, our understanding becomes increasingly fuzzy...

There's also that, yes, so even if scientific observation itself were not already an inherent limitation, we would also face the particular limitations concomitant on scientific observations of a given technology. But this latter category of limitations is often viewed as more forgivable, because it lends itself to a concept of "convergence toward truth", even if we never actually get there in practice. But the former type does not even lend itself to that illusion, so is the more important type to notice.

[Ken G]

I agree that the concept of a designer is scientifically irrelevant, but I would add too that the concept of design as you have described it is also scientifically irrelevant. I explain why here... and in the post that follows, here. I haven't seen any rebuttal yet on your part related to those posts.

My rebuttal to that is the same core rebuttal I've had all along, you argument centers on an interpretation of the meaning of the words that is uninteresting. If we interpret the metaphor of design in the way you interpret it, it is a worthless metaphor. This is exemplified concisely in your statement from those links:

"Design" makes no sense because, contrary to western rational logic, it’s systematically founded on upon the unknowable and absurdity.

Obviously, any concept that is systematically founded on the unknowable, and that is contrary to "western rational logic" (does logic work differently in the east?), would be pointless. But the real question here is, why do you insist on interpreting the meaning of the design metaphor in worthless terms? I certainly don't interpret it that way, because a different interpretation opens up all kinds of interesting metaphysical questions. Again, ask a metaphysical question, get a metaphysical answer-- but defining all the terms so that they have no useful metaphysical content will get you nothing but circular arguments (you define a concept to be useless, then argue it is useless).

If I am mistaken about the concept of "design" feel free to respond in that thread which is specifically on that topic.

I already offered a metaphysically interesting meaning for the design metaphor, many times.

I chose the terms used in the question precisely to avoid any misunderstandings, of the type you convey (that are intrinsic to the word "reality").

All that matters to me is that you recognize that a definition that requires an object be accessible to scientific observation cannot be later used to argue that there is some wider insight to be gained from the fact that the object is only accessible by scientific observation. Objects that are accessible to scientific observation do tend to be addressible only in that format, but this says nothing interesting in general about the successes of metaphysical notions. An isolated aboriginal tribe might speak only their native language, so we would always need to use that language if we wanted to learn about their oral traditions. This fact could not be used as evidence that oral traditions are a generally meaningful concept only in that aboriginal language.

Can we understand nature? Can we understand enough to form a viable model that describes it (to some extent accurately and objectively)? Or, is that goal unattainable?

What is this really asking? Do we not now already have "viable models" that "describe" in a useful and quantitative way many aspects of nature? What is it that we do not now already have that you are wondering if we could ever have? Are you wondering if physics could ever be something qualitatively different, with different goals and success measures, than it is right now? I'd say that's quite unlikely. Are you wondering if it might someday make more accurate predictions or successfully describe more phenomena than it does right now? I'd certainly expect that it will.

Can human beings gain knowledge about that which is not directly observable, e.g., in the subatomic realm?

Human beings gain knowledge routinely without making direct observations of the subatomic realm. Are you asking if a human mind can function in the complete absence of all sensory input? It seems obvious it could not. Can it function in the presence of only the memory of sensory input? Certainly, we do it all the time. So what are you asking? What are you calling a direct observation? Are you asking if humans can know that 2 grogglesparks plus 2 grogglesparks is 4 grogglesparks, even if there's no way for humans to observe grogglesparks or even have any idea if they exist or not? Only this last is actually a metaphysical question, the others are fairly routine.

Really, the aim here is to answer the questions intended, if that is at all possible.

Before turning to the answer of any question, it first has to be made a whole lot clearer what that question is really asking. That's where the interpretation of words becomes unavoidably important.

[mugaliens]

Are you saying that a predicted model, such as one that would describe the universe (a dynamical system), or nature in general (a series of dynamical systems and subsystems), cannot be approximated because, like the weather, after limited durations of time, "reality" would diverges in excess of an acceptable value from the predicted model? And that therefor, the model, or world-view would fail?

Reality is what it is. The model would diverge from reality because a truly accurate model would require an equal number of components as the real world, down to every last quark.

It's simply chaos theory 101.

However, chaos theory allows for loci around which patterns congregate. In the case of the weather, I can accurately predict Colorado Springs will not be 6' under water next year, but I cannot accurately predict the temperature two weeks from now, though I can say I'm 99% certain it'll be somewhere between -5 deg F and 75 deg F, the 100-year record high/low temps.

Your answer leaves open a related question: to what quantitative or qualitative extent would an approximation qualify as acceptable, when the goal is to build an accurate representation of the physical world?

I'm happy enough if they can predict tomorrow's weather! Unfortunately, they're wrong about 15% to 20% of the time due to the variability induced by the mountainous terrain.

However, if by "accurate representation of the world" you will allow the inclusion of various locii and a statistical distribution around those locii, then I would say we can "predict" the weather quite well, but only in general terms (temp spread of 80 deg, centering around 40 deg F), not specific terms (it'll be 40 deg F).

[Coldcreation]

My rebuttal [...]

It would have been nice to keep the brunt of the design rebuttal in the thread where it belongs.

I'll be back for what follows.

[publiusr]

This is not a pipe....

It's Bob Dobbs bumber sticker. To be serious--I think science does well to explain not only what we can see--but what we cannot.

[Coldcreation]

It's Bob Dobbs bumber sticker. To be serious--I think science does well to explain not only what we can see--but what we cannot.

Lol. I agree.


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