
Originally Posted by
mugaliens
I examined the video in detail, and have noted my observations below.
All references to coordinate systems are as follows:
x axis - positive to the right of the video
y axis - positive to the top of the video
z axis - positive in the direction of the rocket's travel
Rotation about any axis is positive using the "right-hand thumbs up" rule. If your right-hand thumb is aligned with an axis, if you curl your fingers, they'll be sweeping from one postive axis to the other, in succession. Thus, positive rotation around the z axis (thumbs up) has your fingers sweeping from the positive x axis to the y axis. If rotation is around the x-axis, fingers will sweep from y to z axis. If rotation is around the y axis, fingers will sweep from the z to x axis.
T+02:49 - First stage cutoff
T+02:51 - Second stage separation; at separation, second stage experiences negative rotation around the y axis, positive rotation around the z axis, and negative rotation around the x axis.
T+02:52 - Negative rotation around y axis causes second stage engine's nozzle to make contact with upper ring of first stage's shroud.
T+02:52 - 02:55 -
T+03:34 - Significant debris appears on the camera plate window
T+03:36 - Debris accumulation stops. Debris still present.
T+04:17 - Second stage engine's guidance corrections become noticeably greater than previously.
T+04:26 - Second stage engine's guidance correction anomaly steadies into a circular/elliptical pattern of negative orbit about the z-axis.
T+04:26 - 04:58 - This pattern grows steadily larger.
T+04:56 - Second stage beging negative rotation around z axis.
T+05:01 - Elliptical warble combined with roll (negative rotation about z axis)
Conclusions:
T+02:51 - Second stage separation; at separation, second stage experiences negative rotation around the y axis, positive rotation around the z axis, and negative rotation around the x axis.
Conclusion: Separation was assymetrical about all three axes.
T+02:52 - Negative rotation around y axis causes second stage engine's nozzle to make contact with upper ring of first stage's shroud.
Conclusion: Impact with nozzle damaged one or more of the nozzle's gymbal sensors or gymbal motors, and possibly induced errors in the inertial guidance system.
T+04:17 - Second stage engine's guidance corrections become noticeably greater than previously.
Conclusion: A malfunction in the guidance system, possibly caused by the T+02:52 event is resulting in unsteady guidance.
T+04:26 - Second stage engine's guidance correction anomaly steadies into a circular/elliptical pattern of negative orbit about the z-axis.
Conclusion: Guidance anomaly worsens throughout fuel burn. Note: The rocket is the most steady with the most fuel, and is least steady with the least fuel.
T+04:56 - Second stage beging negative rotation around z axis.
Conclusion: The guidance anomaly begins to exceed the system's ability to compensate.
T+05:01 - Elliptical warble combined with roll (negative rotation about z axis)
Conclusion: The anomaly exceeds guidance system's ability to compensate, resulting in the subsequent tumble and structural failure of the second stage.
Additional Observations:
1. The instability wasn't sudden, but rather, progressive. Nor did it begin with the collision, as noted in the 1:25 delay between contact and initial instability.
2. The initial instability appeared to be a transition period lasting 9 seconds.
3. The subsequent instability settled into a circular/elliptical wobble about the z axis.
4. The position of the nozzel seemed to lag the instability. Thus, it was engaged in reactionary guidance control.
5. The progressively worsening instability appeared to begin to overburden the guidance system's ability at T+04:56.
6. When gymbal sensors or gymbals fail, even partially, it's usually a sharp demarcation in position, such that an anomaly is noticed immediately.
7. Rockets without fins are inherently unstable. That is, they are dynamically unstable. This requires either very rapid reactive guidance, or good predictive guidance. If it's reactive guidance, the greater the MACH, the more rapid that guidance must be to keep the rocket relatively steady and on course.
8. The second stage, which begins at the top of the wide black band around the top of the first stage, has no fins.
Additional Comments:
1. The collision between the second stage engine and the first stage shround is a fact. Not only can the contact clearly be seen, but the engine nozzle is physically moved in relation to the second stage, but rapidly returns to position before the commencement of second stage burn.
2. This collision may, or may not have lead to the later instability first noted at T+04:17 which later developed into a circular/elliptical wobble at T+04:26.
3. If the collision caused the later instability, it could have done so in three ways:
3a. Damage of the gymbal sensors.
3b. Damage to the gymbal motors.
3c. Damage to the inertial navigation system, principally the directional gyros.
4. The progressive nature of the instability is consistant with two possibilities:
4a. Directional gyro failure
4b. Dynamic instability coupled with a reactive guidance system that is unable to keep up with the progressively greater oscillations
4c. If the oscillations were caused by dynamic instability, that instability was caused by one of two things.
4c1. Increasing dynamic pressures
4c2. Decreasing stability along the z axis. This is normal as fuel is burned and the moment of internia along the z axis is reduced.
Super-Conclusions:
1. It probably wasn't a failure of the gymbal sensors or motors. If that were the case, we would have seen an anomaly much sooner after the second stage nozzle contacted the first stage shroud.
2. It may have involved the directional gyros, but only if they were of the physical, rotating kind (inexpensive, but there's a weight penalty). The collision could have been enough to send a properly stabilized gyro into a destabilizing death spiral, which would be commensurate with the video. Slight jars would not do this, as gyros receive stabilizing inputs to prevent precession. If the jar was serious enough, however, the induced precession may have exceeded the gyro's ability to correct itself. We call the result "tumbling off into the weeds." If the gyros are of the much more expensive ring-laser type, the shock would not have induced precessional destabilization.
3. I suspect that it wasn't a gyroscopic destabilization, but rather, that it was due to the use of an insufficient guidance system, whether reactive or predictive (proactive). Given the lag between the second stage's orientational position and the direction in which the nozzle was pointed, it's clear that the nozzle lagged the necessary correction, and thus was actually causing the wobble as it tried to keep up with the necessary correction. This is indicative of a reactive guidance system, possibly coupled with an error in the amount of dampening used in the correction algorithms.
Conclusive Conclusion (and a bit of a guess):
It wasn't the collision. Rather, the guidance system simply wasn't up to the task of handling the second stage during the progressive dynamic instability encountered during flight.
Recommendations:
1. Use a ring-laser gyro system for three-axis orientation.
2. Use a predictive (proactive) guidance system, not a reactive one.
3. Incorporate orbital/elliptical wobble pattern recognition and propulsion compensation in the guidance algorithms.
4. Use controllers with a little more experience in checklist discipline and military (ie, tense) operations.
Otherwise, nice attempt!