And if we fully duplicat you as a machine, is that machine the human Van Rijn or the machine built after it? Are they equal? I don't knw an answer to this myself, I just open the discussion on that.
And if we fully duplicat you as a machine, is that machine the human Van Rijn or the machine built after it? Are they equal? I don't knw an answer to this myself, I just open the discussion on that.
Of course this is a difficult thing to do. It's a bit like "define art", but different.
I think that real emotions are kept in an internal system of the entity, are created in that entity and do not need to have external use. So it demands self-awareness. They also do not need to be based purely on logic and rules. So they are influenced by other processes than correct, structured reasoning.
Fake emotions are exclusively logical, reasoned, and or rule based values given to situations of an outside system, and reflecting only onto that outside system. If the robot still sees "me, the robot" as an outside system (so if it is not self aware, has nu truly internal system), any judgement about its current state is still dealing effectively with an outside system.
The difference is between a robot merely having information that it's in bad shape and handling in order to improve its values, and a robot that actually cares about being in bad shape, that actually feels it's in bad shape. It's hard for me to put this in words. I can't come up with a better example than guy 1 who really feels depressed because he's working in a badly lit office and hence improves lighting, and guy 2 who's blind and merely is informed that his office is badly lit, which has a depressing effect and hence improves lighting because that action is demanded from the info he's gotten, but he's not feeling depressed at all because he, being blind, doesn't care about the lighting for himself. In this case, theblind guy doesn't look at his internal systm feeling depressed, he sees himself as an external system "human in dark office" and acts according to that. He improves lighting because he's informed that "human in dark office" is bad, and is informed that the office is dark, but not because he feels bad due to the darkness. He is unable to have any feelings related to office light levels, he can only be informed about them and perform actions according to rules on lighting he learned. Though the behaviour of this situation is identical for a spectator, no feelings of the actor are involved.
(the being informed equals robot sensors here, the rules on lighting equals the reference the robot measures the effectivity of his actions against)
(don't go into the abstract details of this example where a blind man goes out and improves the lighting in his office on command, it's just an example)
Due to the holidays, I won't be here for about a week.
I would say that both are Van Rijn. They are the person that is me.
Yes, in the sense that they are both equally me.Are they equal?
In earlier threads, I've discussed the "body identity" view versus the "pattern identity" view. The body identity view is that one is the body that they inhabit. The pattern identity view is that one is the pattern that define's one's emotions, intelligence, beliefs, actions, and so forth, regardless of medium.I don't knw an answer to this myself, I just open the discussion on that.
And we've discussed the issues with these. The chemicals (neurotransmitters, chemicals involved in metabolism, even water) that allow your brain to function, that result in what we call "mind" are constantly changing. So, physically, "I" am only a small fraction of the "I" of a year ago. What am I but the pattern defined by the structure of the brain?
Keep in mind, though, that even pattern changes. While I think a lot like the Van Rijn of twenty years ago, there are also significant changes in behavior. Am "I" of today the same "I" of two decades ago?
Ultimately, I would say that we are the continuity of the pattern that defines us. Significant enough changes (such as complete amnesia) would result in the death of that continuity of pattern.
On the other hand, if you could physically duplicate me with a replicator like device (as horrible as I know that sounds), I would say that the result would be two Van Rijns, even though they would tend to diverge over time.
By the same token, if my pattern is either copied or moved to another medium, that is still me.
I say there is an invisible elf in my backyard. How do you prove that I am wrong?
The Leif Ericson Cruiser
Picking into that, another thought on this: so we make an identical machine copy of Van Rijn today. Now Van Rijn is a complex system (going highly hypothetical hereOn the other hand, if you could physically duplicate me with a replicator like device (as horrible as I know that sounds), I would say that the result would be two Van Rijns, even though they would tend to diverge over time.![]()
) and hence at least partly unpredictable. So we can safely assume that robot Van Rijn and good ole flesh and bones Van Rijn will not be in an identical (mental) state 20 years later, they will not always have made the same decisions, had the same experiences etc. Is robot Van Rijn still equal to Van Rijn in 20 years, is it still Van Rijn? You have 2 clearly different Van Rijns then, but we should still see them as the same Van Rijn?
On a more philosophical level, should Robot Van Rijn have as much rights as flesh and bones Van Rijn? Why (not)? Does that change when they start to divert? What if robot van rijn becomes a criminal, should that influence how we act with flesh and bones van rijn? Should a robot copy of someone who later becomes a criminal be preventively destroyed or does that go against its rights (it hasn't done anything wrong, just its original copy)?
Of course all this assumes we have a robot system capable of real feelings, as otherwise it is by no means a copy of a human.
And we would have to review the board rules on sock puppets if that becomes a reality.
So the question is, what would be the rights of that duplicate? Would it be entitled to your pension, as much as "you" are?
Would it be entitled to your house?
Would it be entitled to your wife*?
Well, then, I guess it would be.
*Yes, I know how sexist that sounds. The point is whether your legal obligations toward your spouse (and your spouse's toward you) would be on the duplicate as well.
Yes, since they are both the continuity of Van Rijn of today. Different future experiences would lead to different decisions.
Yes, they're both me.On a more philosophical level, should Robot Van Rijn have as much rights as flesh and bones Van Rijn? Why (not)? Does that change when they start to divert?
Very possibly, but it depends on circumstances. Did I have the idea of becoming a robot criminal before the duplication, or did this occur much later due to diverging experiences by the robot? Certainly I would expect an investigation of the flesh and bones Van Rijn.What if robot van rijn becomes a criminal, should that influence how we act with flesh and bones van rijn?
Again, I'd look at where the actions of the two "I"s diverged, and second, the punishment should be commensurate with the crime. Unless the flesh and blood me was subject to capital punishment, it should not be applied to the robot me.Should a robot copy of someone who later becomes a criminal be preventively destroyed or does that go against its rights (it hasn't done anything wrong, just its original copy)?
I say there is an invisible elf in my backyard. How do you prove that I am wrong?
The Leif Ericson Cruiser
If I am uploaded (moved, not duplicated), then there is no issue. I am still me, just as I am still the "me" of yesterday.
If I decide to duplicate myself, I had better work out the legalities for the multiple "me"s before I go through with it, or I am going to be very annoyed with myself afterwards.![]()
I say there is an invisible elf in my backyard. How do you prove that I am wrong?
The Leif Ericson Cruiser
I have an idea that the copying process involved in making a duplicate person would be destructive in that the original would be destroyed as with the collapsing of wave functions in QM.
I personally think that there is a supernatural element to human and other animals biological processes but see no reason why that would necessarily be impossible in man-made machines so the fact that they were artificial creations wouldn't stop them being conscious or having emotions.
I think that it would be highly likely that they did have some kind of emotional life but that it would be a bit alien or perhaps they would be like autistic savants.
A lot of human nature(I think) comes from our evolutionary past, especially our chimp-like ancestry and these AI system just wouldn't have that kind of mental make up. So, like someone said, they will need a kind of childhood in order to learn and play and gain social skills if they are going to be able to interact with humans. I don't know about a mining robot, I think that the AI/robots that don't interact with humans, could develop their own culture. It could be quite interesting. There could be AI robots that where skilled communicators that could go between the AI cultures and the human culture, like diplomats or even comedians.
If you were to send a probe to another star then communication with Earth would become very difficult and I think the solution would be to send many(millions maybe) AI units all wrapped up in the probe, so that the culture that the AI units had could go along with them.
I can't see that it would ever be really acceptable that a complex AI unit would be considered as disposable(say as a probe into a black hole), especially by other AI units so there would be many things that still had to be done by remote.
The lines are clear at the moment but we are potentially looking at the Darwinian debate of the future.
To the ancients our mastery of technology would appear to give us "god" in small letters like powers.
We progressed by not only being the sum of our biological parts but exceeding them as a group.
The best example I can think of is teenagers and now children. There was a time when they existed
but had no authority. For teenagers that caused problems because you only have to look a them
to know they have power. They evolved from existence through confusion to partial control by being
able to challenge orders. From limited responsibility and desire the awareness of real power became rights.
The lines will blur as AI and robotic potential evolve, just as the pursuit of enhanced human
capacity through implant technology, but then again that's if we allow it. The spectacular success of a rather
weak collection of organic tissue has been its capacity for altruism.
There will always be sides and for a while we have the choices, but ultimately only time will tell.
Cheers
There's already a duplicate of me walking around and nobody seems to mind. We get on well together, although I don't like the way he sometimes calls me Organbank.If I decide to duplicate myself, I had better work out the legalities for the multiple "me"s before I go through with it, or I am going to be very annoyed with myself afterwards.
Not in that article and nowhere Iīve read about his ideas.
Well, his detractors are yet to come up with something better. To link consciousness to quantum activity presenting coherent mathematical concepts is not what Iīd call woo-woo.Until there is specific evidence for this, I certainly wouldn't label it "insight."
As for evidences, I just have to agree.
I say there is an invisible elf in my backyard. How do you prove that I am wrong?
The Leif Ericson Cruiser
I say there is an invisible elf in my backyard. How do you prove that I am wrong?
The Leif Ericson Cruiser
Not identical, but people don't believe me. I am much better looking. I mean the guy's chin is enormous, where as mine is just manly. His chin is so large that if he agreeded with you too enthusiastically he'd risk staving in his own rib cage with it. He's the only man I know who can give Jay Leno a run for his money. He only has to walk past a gym and guys come out asking him where they can score some growth hormone. If he ever needs a bone graft they could use his chin to reconstruct his entire skeleton. He has more chin they Beijing. He's not a man, he's a life support system for his chin. When climatologists work out where the extra carbon has gone, it's 12% into biomass, 25% into the oceans and the rest into my brother's chin. His chin is so large it emits beeping noises whenever he walks backwards. He is chinful in the eyes of the lord. A guy standing at the other end of the room pointed at the ceiling and when my brother looked up he knocked him out.Identical twin?
So, does he read this forum?
I say there is an invisible elf in my backyard. How do you prove that I am wrong?
The Leif Ericson Cruiser
He doesn't even have the internet, but he's a computer nut, so go figure. Maybe he's just optimizing his productivity.So, does he read this forum?
He doesnīt understand conciousness, but who does? I canīt read any supernatural statement in the text I linked. Heīs got a valid hypothesis and gives name to the physical structures he thinks are responsible for the phenomenon of conciousness [which is not a supernatural word for me]. You may have a beef with that theory, but saying he proposes supernatural causes for conciousness is certainly a stretch.
Penrose suggests that the inclusion of quantum level processes into the phenomenon of consciousness makes that phenomenon essentially beyond explanation.
That doesn't mean it can't be studied and replicated, even if his hypothesis is true; after all, every day new human minds are created by a relatively simple process, and similar minds are created in the young of innumerable other species. If it is necessary to include a quantum level component in the function of an artificial consciousness then I see no reason why this cannot be done.
You could end up with a kind of conciousness that conceptualizes the universe in such a different manner that any interaction between humans and sentient machines could well be virtually impossible.
Some people conjecture about the so-called "incommensurability problem", as applied to the search of ETI. I donīt mean to hijack the thread, but the issue is pertinent here, since it deals with the interaction between two forms of intelligence.
"At the core of the Incommensurability Problem is the view that no intelligent species can understand reality without making certain methodological choices, and that these choices may vary from civilization to civilization"
Last edited by Argos; 2006-Dec-26 at 02:10 PM. Reason: Spelling
But I am not sure that his (Penrose's) hypothesis is necessarily true in any case. There are quantum level aspects to every aspect of the universe, but that doesn't mean we can never understand our world, or try to manipulate it.
Consciousness is one tool we may soon be introducing into artificially intelligent systems in many different forms, and attempting to reproduce human consciousness may not be an effective use of this phenomenon. I like very much Nicholas' idea of an entity which thinks of its own systems as just another system to be controlled; such a system could probably be made very 'smart' and 'competent'.
I think there will be many other configurations of artificially intelligent machine, and some will be entirely controllable and subject to restrictions. Those types would perhaps be the only type of artificially intelligent entity we should consider building, or allow to be built.
But an artificially bounded, restricted intelligent entity would almost certainly lack certain (possibly) desirable attributes, such as intellectual curiosity. If an entity as described by Nicholas, with its 'self' defined as 'another' were to be intellectually curious, eventually that entity might compose a theory of self which included its own existence; especially if one allowed that entity to read the accumulated philosophical outpourings of the Dualists and other humans.
I suspect that will be many different styles and forms of artificial consciousness. one we find a way of manipulating them; but if fully self aware AI holds any competitive advantage (and I suspect it will) then someone, somewhere, will eventually start making them, prohibited or not.
Creating other forms of consciousness might be a survival prerequisite, if there really is a Incommensurability Problem as described by Davis; we may eventually meet minds which have almost no points of reference in common with our own, and modelling non-human intelligence might give us a head start in understanding those minds.
Let's see... if I copied myself into a robot shell, I can safely assume that I, the meatbag, would know how it would react. First, I think, I'd be halfway annoyed, yet intrigued. What is this new body made of? What am I now capable of? Do I owe the builder any money? I didn't agree to it! What can I expect as far as life expectancy. If I break, who do I have to see? What kinda batteries am I on? Can I see the original me? Do I get half his stuff? Does the place he work at now have another opening? What kind of memory capacity do I have? Can I connect to the internet?