
Originally Posted by
JayUtah
Arguments of the form, "You say X happened, but you don't have evidence to show that Y didn't happen instead," deny the inductive leap. When a jury convicts someone, they acknowledge that it's possible that all the evidence against him could still be true, but that he is nevertheless innocent.
Most conspiracy theories taken the approach of trying to widen the inductive leap required in the prevalent theory. That is, they say, "There are so many anomalies and inconsistencies that you really have to stretch your imagination in order to believe that X happened." Or, as I sometimes call it, the FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt) approach. The goal is to so erode faith in X that any alternative Y, no matter how ludicrous, starts to look better by comparison. Often Y can explain individual anomalies with much greater facility, but that isn't sufficient as we discover below.
Remember that the goal of conspiracy rhetoric is to bog down the discussion, not to make progress toward a solution. As long as conspiracy theories simply "call for more research" or assert that "it remains an open question," their proponents will continue to enjoy attention.
As we discover, the alleged "anomalies" and "inconsistencies" almost always turn out to be a failure to meet the ignorant and ill-founded expectations of the conspiracy theorists. And so it's tempting to spend a lot of time arguing whether those expectations are right or wrong. Hog-heaven for the conspiracist. By quibbling over just how wide that inductive leap is, the argument becomes endlessly subjective and fails to acknowledge that the absolute width of the leap is utterly irrelevant.
Whether one's inductive leap is trivial or strenuous is irrelevant if it's still the shortest one. That is, the theory to which we rationally subscribe is always the best theory, regardless of how objectively good it is. If the inductive leap for one theory is long, we can still hold to it if the leap in other theories is still longer.
The only meaningful challenge to one line of induction is another line of induction whose inductive leap is shorter. The question is thus not that X isn't proved sufficiently to remove the inductive leap altogether and thus reject Y categorically. It isn't that X's inductive leap is so long that you're just better off believing Y on general principles. The question -- the only proper question, that is -- is whether the inductive leap associated with Y is greater or lesser than X's leap.
That's why you never get a coherent Y out of conspiracists. That's why they'll have individual scenarios that explain individual anomalies (thermite on the steel, missiles at the Pentagon, etc.) but no coherent full-scale theory. Why? Because by giving you just bits and pieces, or by claiming they don't have or need a Y because they're only "raising issues", they don't give you anything whose inductive leap can be measured against X's.
It's blindness, for sure, but it's blindness in the sense that they don't understand why their approach will never be given equal consideration alongside a testable theory.