Popper and Falsification(ism)

[Disinfo Agent]

Theories are falsified by observations (experiments). A theory does not falsify another theory, since they can be both wrong.

[Sparky56]

Where did you get that quote from? It's not in 'The Problem of Induction', if by that you mean this essay.

I didn't realise this was in doubt, as I have heard it so many times. This having been said, I cannot find that many online references just now.

http://humankindadvancing.humanists.net/02/02-03.html
From: Facing Reality, (by Eccles) 1970, P. 107.

"Nobel Laureate Sir John Eccles, another person knighted for his outstanding contribution to science -- in his case to neuroscience -- and a friend of Karl Popper, describes the insight that falsification is the normal fate of all hypotheses and the consequent resolution to expect and accept criticism as a liberating experience.

"The erroneous belief that science eventually leads to the certainty of a definitive explanation carries with it the implication that it is a grave scientific misdemeanour to have published some hypothesis that eventually is falsified. As a consequence scientists have often been loath to admit the falsification of such a hypothesis, and their lives may be wasted in defending the no longer defensible. Whereas, according to Popper, falsification in whole or in part is the anticipated fate of all hypotheses, and we should even rejoice in the falsification of a hypothesis that we have cherished as a brain-child. One is thereby relieved from fears and remorse, and science becomes an exhilarating adventure where imagination and vision lead to conceptual developments transcending the generality and range of the experimental evidence."

As regards the Problem of Induction, Popper did not invent this. He recognised it, as did many other philosophers, and conceived Fal' in an attempt to overcome it. (Fal is widely recognised for it's efficacy in this respect.) Discussions of the problem, therefore, do not necessarily mention Popper or his method, as the problem obvisously preceded the proposed solution.

[Disinfo Agent]

I would rather you found Popper's own words.

Even so, I note that your source speaks of 'falsification in whole or in part.' That seems different from what you had been saying, perhaps significantly so.

[TheBlackCat]

You still haven't proven your point Sparky. The fact that it is the normal fate does not mean it is the required fate. The fact that it is the anticipated fate does not mean it is the necessary fate. It is normal for people to have 5 fingers, but it is by no means a requirement. It would be reasonable for future parents to expect their child to be born with 5 fingers, but that does not mean it is a requirement. Just because it is what is normal, what happens most of the time, does not mean it will happen all of the time. In fact, that is the very point Popper was trying to make. No matter how many times you do something, you will never know if it may turn out differently the next time. No matter how many times we try to falsify a theory and eventually succeed, we will never know if the next theory we try to falsify will never be falsified.

[Sparky56]

Now. It is entirely possible that human understanding is necessarily finite.

Yes, it is possible, but according to the Fal method, it is assumed of necessity. Granted, I need to do some more work to support my case.

But what I'm not getting from you, Sparky, is why "finite," in your description thereof, equals "nonexistant." We can get some things right, and that still wouldn't make human knowledge infinite, just bigger than it was before. After all, there's a huge range between "none at all" and "infinite," and surely with enough work, we'll get something right.

Until a theory is falsified, it is to all practical purposes considered 'right' in so far as it is a workable model.

Theories are steps on a ladder towards a greater understanding of life, the universe, and everything.

[Sparky56]

No matter how many times you do something, you will never know if it may turn out differently the next time.

Yes. At last.

No matter how many times we try to falsify a theory and eventually succeed, we will never know if the next theory we try to falsify will never be falsified.

The point is that, according to the method, corroboration has less value than testability. And, as we devise more tests, the chances of falsifying it...

[Sparky56]

I have difficulty with term "falsification'. Is correct to say that relativity falsify Newtonian mechanics? Perhaps more accurate to say Newtonian mechanics special case for some components negligible value.

This is a tricky area. A new theory can extend an old theory without falsifying it, perhaps. Also, some theories are not so much theories as collections of theories. The Big Bang, for example, is probably better regarded as a concept, or a collection of theories.

If, for example, the CMB turns out to have a different source, this would not necessarily deal a death knell to the BBT, would it?

My understanding is that Newtonian physics were accomodated rather than scrapped? Or were some aspects shown to be false?

[TheBlackCat]

Yes. At last.

THIS IS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN SAYING ALL ALONG. Please don't make it sound like I just figured this out, everybody on this topic has been saying this over and over and over again.

The point is that, according to the method, corroboration has less value than testability. And, as we devise more tests, the chances of falsifying it...

...drop. The more succesful tests we do on something, the less likely the next test will be to falsify it. Generally, a hypothesis gets to a certain point where it is unlikely enough that it will be falsified by future tests that we can give it tentative approval. This is what we call a "theory". It is not proven, but it's chance of being correct is high enough that it is safe to tentatively make use of it for predicting behavior of a system.

[Sparky56]

Infinite value? I'm not quite sure what you mean by that Popper's methodology forbids us from ever accepting a theory as absolutely true.

Infinite value/Absolute truth/truth/final truth/proven. Same difference. I will elaborate on this when I tackle the issue from the 'Problem of Induction' angle.

Does our limited knowledge change the fact that the theory is either true or false from the outset? Or are you proposing some sort of "quantum reality" of scientific knowledge, where the theory is neither true nor false, since we don't know for sure?

Hmmm. I didn't want to get into metaphysics, but effectively, yes. The inductive method is rational, but illogical. Falsifiabilty might be seen as irrational, but it is logically valid. I will get back to you on this.

I see that you're at least acknowledging that your claim implies that all theories are false. So, again, why is "falsifiable" logically equivalent to "false"?

Well, I hate to say it, but yes and no.

For all practical purposes, a theory is not falsified until is is found to be false.

However, a logical equivalent is not a logical consequce. A sound theory is a reasonable working model, even if the Fal method implies that it is destined to be falsified. Remember, as Popper observed -- "That a theory is false does not mean it cannot have verisimilitude."

As I have said, I will attempt to address the issue from a different angle, that is, from the pespective of the problem of induction.

[Gillianren]

Yes, it is possible, but according to the Fal method, it is assumed of necessity. Granted, I need to do some more work to support my case.

No, you're good there. I happen to believe myself that, at least, any individual's comprehension is necessarily finite; no human mind is capable of holding all knowledge.

Until a theory is falsified, it is to all practical purposes considered 'right' in so far as it is a workable model.

True, but irrelevant to my point, really. My point is, you did in fact say that all theories have, essentially, a shelf life. As in, they will all, according to you, eventually be proven wrong. Whereas what we keep trying to explain, in more ways than I'd previously realized possible, is that just because something can be proven wrong doesn't mean it will be proven wrong. According to what you seem to be saying, we might as well just give up now on trying to understand anything, because we're just wrong and we always will be. What we're saying is that we might've gotten some explanations right, but we can never 100% know for sure, because the next test might prove us wrong.

Theories are steps on a ladder towards a greater understanding of life, the universe, and everything.

Well, yes again, and again, kind of irrelevant to what we've been trying to explain to you. After all, if we use your premise that no theory will ever be right, and all will eventually be proven wrong, we are not increasing our understanding of the universe, because we're still wrong. It's just a new and different wrong than we were before.

[Sparky56]

The more succesful tests we do on something, the less likely the next test will be to falsify it.

On the face of it this makes sense, but I have reservations in line with the man himself.

http://www.geocities.com/healthbase/falsification.html
From Karl Popper:

1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory - if we look for confirmations.

2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory - an event which would have refuted the theory.

6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.")

[Sparky56]

True, but irrelevant to my point, really. My point is, you did in fact say that all theories have, essentially, a shelf life.

I am arguing that this 'shelf-life' is a natural consequence of the method, but this is disputed by some.

As in, they will all, according to you, eventually be proven wrong.

Effectively, yes, at least according to the method.

Whereas what we keep trying to explain, in more ways than I'd previously realized possible, is that just because something can be proven wrong doesn't mean it will be proven wrong.

OK. I will attempt to counter this from a different angle. Later.

According to what you seem to be saying, we might as well just give up now on trying to understand anything, because we're just wrong and we always will be. What we're saying is that we might've gotten some explanations right, but we can never 100% know for sure, because the next test might prove us wrong.

Not quite. As Popper said: "We should celebrate the falsification of a theory as, ultimately, this represents progress." New theories are improvements on the old, of course.

After all, if we use your premise that no theory will ever be right, and all will eventually be proven wrong, we are not increasing our understanding of the universe, because we're still wrong. It's just a new and different wrong than we were before.

No, it's a better wrong, that is more right and less wrong than before. Progress.

"It is impossible to speak in such a way that you cannot be misunderstood." Karl Popper

"Science may be described as the art of systematic over-simplification." Karl Popper

[worzel]

1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory - if we look for confirmations.

2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory - an event which would have refuted the theory.

6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.")

Again, nothing you quote supports your conclusion. When will you stop preaching and directly answer the question: how does a theory's falsifiability logically entail its falsehood?

[Sparky56]

Again, nothing you quote supports your conclusion. When will you stop preaching and directly answer the question: how does a theory's falsifiability logically entail its falsehood?

This is not my conclusion! It is a gross oversimplification.

[worzel]

Again, nothing you quote supports your conclusion. When will you stop preaching and directly answer the question: how does a theory's falsifiability logically entail its falsehood?

This is not my conclusion! It is a gross oversimplification.

Yes it is (the logical consequence) of your conclusion, remember

A theory can only be conclusivley falsified, ie., disproved, but never conclusively verified (proved), as all scientific theories, by definition, are vulnerable to being falsififed, and are therefore only valid for a finite time.

That does not logically follow. If a theory just happens to be exactly correct then it will never be falsified. Just because we can never prove a theory is correct doesn't mean that it is necessarily false.

You have admitted as much here:

You have denied an obvious consequence of your conclusion (if all theories will be falsified, then all theories are false) without demonstrating any logical reason for your denial.

This, I'm afraid, is the logical consequence of the method. All theories, according to Popper, are but steps on a ladder. Additionally, this attitiude of mind prevents stagnation.

If every falsifiable theory is only valid for a finte time then it will be falsified within a finte time and was therefore invalid all along. So your claim that every falsifiable theory is only valid for a finte time is equivalent to the statement that a theory's falsifiability implies its falsehood. Please now explain how a theory's falsifiability implies its falsehood.

[Gillianren]

First: Duane, it's "hypotheses."

I am arguing that this 'shelf-life' is a natural consequence of the method, but this is disputed by some.

Er, it's argued by all of us. In fact, I'm pretty convinced now that Popper would be arguing with you on this one.

Not quite. As Popper said: "We should celebrate the falsification of a theory as, ultimately, this represents progress." New theories are improvements on the old, of course.

Okay, but if they're all wrong, where's the improvement?

No, it's a better wrong, that is more right and less wrong than before. Progress.

I'm afraid I'm going to have to call this a contradiction, here. You see, in order for this to be true, some part of it must be right. If, as you say, they're all eventually proven wrong, that would mean that no part of them could be right. Since theories are constantly refined, it is entirely possible that one part is right and one wrong, and we change the wrong part to make it more right. This is like the computing-pi-using-polygons method, where we get closer and closer without ever quite getting it exactly right--but some part (to quite a lot of decimal places, now) is right. Despite what you think.

[worzel]

Sorry Gillianren, but I disagree with you on this one. It may well be that we never get a theory exactly right. But theories that are technically not correct can still be very useful. In one sense, Newton's theory of gravity is wrong, in another sense it is a first order approximation to relativity. Maybe relativity will turn out to be a first order approximation to another theory that matches predictions even closer (that assumes we first find relativity inaccurate in some circumstances). Maybe not. Either way, Newton's theory is still useful, and Einstein's will be whether it turns out to be falsified or not. Remember that Newton's theory can only be seen to be false with extremely accurate measurements - that it fails there where relativity doesn't, doesn't mean it suddenly loses it predictive power.

The only disagreement I have with Sparky56 in this is his implicit claim that all falsifiable theories are necessarily false.

[Sparky56]

Gillianren is absolutely spot on in so far as she recognises the implications of the methodology. Cool.

However, I think that Gillianren disagrees about the consequences, and feels that the method is negative. To an extent I agree, as this is a common criticism of Fal. It does seem very negative, it has to be said. But there are reasons for this 'negativity'.

Sorry Gillianren, but I disagree with you on this one. It may well be that we never get a theory exactly right.

You say you disagree, and then in the same sentence you seem to agree! This is just nitpicking, of course, so I will move onto the next point.

But theories that are technically not correct can still be very useful.

Yes, exactly. And this is very important. It is essential to grasp it. As Popper observed: "That a theory is false does not mean it cannot have verisimilitude."

In one sense, Newton's theory of gravity is wrong, in another sense it is a first order approximation to relativity. Maybe relativity will turn out to be a first order approximation to another theory that matches predictions even closer (that assumes we first find relativity inaccurate in some circumstances). Maybe not. Either way, Newton's theory is still useful, and Einstein's will be whether it turns out to be falsified or not. Remember that Newton's theory can only be seen to be false with extremely accurate measurements - that it fails there where relativity doesn't, doesn't mean it suddenly loses it predictive power.

Interesting. Despite how I may have put it earlier, I would argue that a new theory falsifies a preceding theory by virtue of the fact that it can better account for observations. The fact that the older theory lacked the same accuracy clearly indicates that it was lacking in some important respect.

Granted the old theory may still be useful in many ways, but the new theory has revealed its vulnerabilities. Popper talked in terms of theories being stepping stones. They progress, most often, on the back of one another. I think your paragraph above is an excellent illustration of this.

These are not criticisms of Newtonian mechanics. They marked great progress, and as Popper said, perhaps we 'should celebrate the falsification of a theory' for this very reason.

The only disagreement I have with Sparky56 in this is his implicit claim that all falsifiable theories are necessarily false.

As I have said, I think this is an oversimplification, but yes, it hints at the big issue. As Grey said, it seems I am suggesting some form of quantum reality of theories and, well, yes, the method does get quasi-metaphysical.

As I said ealier.

1. A theory is not falsified for all practical purposes until it is found to be false.

2. However, this having been said, the method presumes that no theory can ever represent the final truth. By implication, therefore, it contains some degree of error, because the method presumes that a better theory will always come along.

This is a logical consequence of: "No theory can ever be conclusively verified, it can only be concusively falsified."

If we examine the Problem of Induction, I think this will become more clear.

[Baloo]

2. However, this having been said, the method presumes that no theory can ever represent the final truth. By implication, therefore, it contains some degree of error, because the method presumes that a better theory will always come along.

Just an aside question: this means that Popper's theory is also wrong?

[Celestial Mechanic]

Life is too short to waste on philosophy!

I think that Popper and Kuhn are two of the worst things to happen to science since the Inquisition, judging from all the balloon-juice spilled over the last four pages of this thread.

One last comment: it is a long, long way from "may possibly" to "will be". Always has been, always will be.

[worzel]

Gillianren is absolutely spot on in so far as she recognises the implications of the methodology. Cool.

Well she, along with everyone else who's voiced an opinion, catagorically disagreed with your conclusion that a falsifiable theory is, by implication, false.

Sorry Gillianren, but I disagree with you on this one. It may well be that we never get a theory exactly right.

You say you disagree, and then in the same sentence you seem to agree! This is just nitpicking, of course, so I will move onto the next point.

That was worse than just nitpicking, you are completely missing the point. Gillianren said "Okay, but if they're all wrong, where's the improvement?" and went on to argue that at least some part of a theory must be right for us to have improvement. I was disagreeing by saying that although each theory along the way may technically be incorrect in every regard, that does not mean that there is no improvement. Newton's theory is never exactly right about any prediction, is it.

Yes, exactly. And this is very important. It is essential to grasp it. As Popper observed: "That a theory is false does not mean it cannot have verisimilitude."

Interesting. Despite how I may have put it earlier, I would argue that a new theory falsifies a preceding theory by virtue of the fact that it can better account for observations. The fact that the older theory lacked the same accuracy clearly indicates that it was lacking in some important respect.

Granted the old theory may still be useful in many ways, but the new theory has revealed its vulnerabilities. Popper talked in terms of theories being stepping stones. They progress, most often, on the back of one another. I think your paragraph above is an excellent illustration of this.

These are not criticisms of Newtonian mechanics. They marked great progress, and as Popper said, perhaps we 'should celebrate the falsification of a theory' for this very reason.

Who on earth are you talking to? You're certainly not responding the post of mine that you quoted.

The only disagreement I have with Sparky56 in this is his implicit claim that all falsifiable theories are necessarily false.

As I have said, I think this is an oversimplification, but yes, it hints at the big issue. As Grey said, it seems I am suggesting some form of quantum reality of theories and, well, yes, the method does get quasi-metaphysical.

If you remember,I asked you something similar (although badly worded) back here

Unless, that is, you believe that the actual (as opposed to known) laws of physics change when a theory is falsified - is that what you believe?

Of course, you never answered that quesion, you just quoted Popper, did a little dance, and repeated your incorrect conclusion.

As I said ealier.

1. A theory is not falsified for all practical purposes until it is found to be false.

2. However, this having been said, the method presumes that no theory can ever represent the final truth. By implication, therefore, it contains some degree of error, because the method presumes that a better theory will always come along.

The method assumes that no theory can ever represent the final truth because we can never know that a theory does - not because it is a logical necessity that they can't.

This is a logical consequence of: "No theory can ever be conclusively verified, it can only be concusively falsified."

You accuse me, yet again, of over-simplifying your argument, and then straight away you make exactly the same simple logical error. And ye again you fail to answer the question. How does the falsifiability of a theory logically imply that the theory is actually false? Please just answer that one question or withdraw your claim that a logical consequence of "No theory can ever be conclusivel verified" is that every theory is false.

[Disinfo Agent]

Life is too short to waste on philosophy!

I think that Popper and Kuhn are two of the worst things to happen to science since the Inquisition, judging from all the balloon-juice spilled over the last four pages of this thread.

You might as well say that Jesus was one of the worst thing to happen to mankind, judging from what some of his followers have done.

Don't judge Popper and Kuhn by people who claim to speak on their behalf, but clearly don't even understand what Popper and Kuhn wrote.

[Grey]

Infinite value/Absolute truth/truth/final truth/proven. Same difference. I will elaborate on this when I tackle the issue from the 'Problem of Induction' angle.

Ah, I see the problem. I would not consider most of those terms to be synonymous. In particular, infinite value seems to imply some measure of great worth that the others do not (although perhaps "absolute truth" and "final truth" have similar connotations). And in particular, I'd consider there to be a huge difference between whether a claim is true and whether it can be or has been proven. Indeed, Gödel's work was specifically showing that there are true statements of mathematics that cannot be proven using formal logic.

Does our limited knowledge change the fact that the theory is either true or false from the outset? Or are you proposing some sort of "quantum reality" of scientific knowledge, where the theory is neither true nor false, since we don't know for sure?

Hmmm. I didn't want to get into metaphysics, but effectively, yes. The inductive method is rational, but illogical. Falsifiabilty might be seen as irrational, but it is logically valid. I will get back to you on this.

For all practical purposes, a theory is not falsified until is is found to be false.

Let's not talk about for practical purposes, here. We're discussing the nature of reality, after all, which is hardly practical. Of course a theory is not falsified until it is found to be false. But is a theory false if the experiment which contradicts it will not be done until next week?

Say I make a statement. Most people would agree with me that such a statement is either true or false. We may not know which it is, but our lack of knowledge does not change the fact that it is one or the other. If we find evidence that it is one or the other, we discover whether it was true or false, but we presume it was true or false all along, and our discovery of which is was did not suddenly change its truth or falsehood.

A theory of how nature works is nothing more than such a statement, except for a slight twist. A theory is a statement that always implicitly includes the claim "things always work this way". That's why proving such a statement true isn't possible, since the statement is a claim for all future cases as well, and we'll never run out of possible cases to test. But most would presume that it's still a statement, it is still either true or false. If we find evidence that it is false, we consider it to have been false (though perhaps a good approximation) all along, and if we have not yet proven it false, we consider that it reamins either true or false, we just don't know which.

You're claiming the opposite. That a theory's trueness depends on our knowledge thereof. That since we don't know whether it's true or false, it is neither, until we find out (and of course we can only find out conclusively if it is false; remember, nobody is arguing the reverse here, so you needn't keep stressing it).

Now, since I've worked with quantum theory, I know that it's possible to make a statement which is neither true nor false, but which suddenly becomes true or false only once we check. You might think that the laws of nature are of a similar form, ever changing and random. Quantum mechanics itself seems to have fixed rules that can explain this behavior of attributes that don't exist until measured, but you might feel that the very laws themselves might be subject to this kind of indeterminacy. Or you might instead think that the laws of nature or so complex that they can never be written in any closed form. For example, as we probed ever further, we discovered that things are made of atoms, and then that the atoms are made of smaller particles, and then that some of those particles are made of still smaller particles; you might think that this progression will never end, and that there will always be a level on a smaller scale to be discovered.

In either of those cases, it would indeed be impossible to ever have a true theory (remember, only in the sense that it is true, which is distinct from whether we've proven it of whether we know it to be true; even if you firmly believe these are linked, surely you can at least acknowledge them as differing concepts so that we can have a meaningful conversation about the possibilities), in the former case because there's no such thing as truth apart from what can be proven, and in the latter case because truth is infinitely complex. There may be other philosophical views which also preclude the existence of truth. However, I don't think that such views necessarily follow directly from Popper's ideas about falsification. You're free to hold such views, of course, but I think it's a mistake to attribute them to Popper.

[Jim]

Okay, I realize this is a losing struggle toward comprehension, but I'm going to make a go at it. ...

And an excellent go it was! Nicely done.

However, I think that Gillianren disagrees about the consequences, and feels that the method is negative. To an extent I agree, as this is a common criticism of Fal. It does seem very negative, it has to be said. But there are reasons for this 'negativity'.

I don't think anyone here feels that the method is negative, but your interpretation of it. You seem to insist that "Falsification is the anticipated fate of all genuinely scientific theories" logically leads to the conclusion that all theories must be proven false... that they therefore have a finite shelf life. Can you provide a quote of Popper's that actually says this? If not, then it remains your interpretation of what he did say.

[Cougar]

Life is too short to waste on philosophy!

I think that Popper and Kuhn are two of the worst things to happen to science since the Inquisition, judging from all the balloon-juice spilled over the last four pages of this thread.

How right you are! Kuhn's reputation is especially curious.

[Added: Oops. If you don't want to sign up for a free account to read that linked article, try this one.]

[Sparky56]

Just an aside question: this means that Popper's theory is also wrong?

No. Fal' is a methodology, not a theory.

[Sparky56]

I don't think anyone here feels that the method is negative, but your interpretation of it. You seem to insist that "Falsification is the anticipated fate of all genuinely scientific theories" logically leads to the conclusion that all theories must be proven false... that they therefore have a finite shelf life. Can you provide a quote of Popper's that actually says this? If not, then it remains your interpretation of what he did say.

"Falsification is the anticipated fate of all scientific theories." Karl Popper

[Gillianren]

Gillianren is absolutely spot on in so far as she recognises the implications of the methodology. Cool.

Uh oh. Maybe I'm wrong . . . . (But thanks for using the right pronoun, anyway.)

However, I think that Gillianren disagrees about the consequences, and feels that the method is negative. To an extent I agree, as this is a common criticism of Fal. It does seem very negative, it has to be said. But there are reasons for this 'negativity'.

Um, no. I disagree with your interpretation of the consequences. I feel that your method is, inevitably, wrong.

Let's put this in an even simpler way, shall we?

According to Merriam-Webster:

Anticipate: 1 : to give advance thought, discussion, or treatment to
2 : to meet (an obligation) before a due date
3 : to foresee and deal with in advance : FORESTALL
4 : to use or expend in advance of actual possession
5 : to act before (another) often so as to check or counter
6 : to look forward to as certain : EXPECT

Inevitable: : incapable of being avoided or evaded

In other words (and other, and other, and other!): something may be anticipated without being inevitable!

Now, we are using Defintion 6 of "anticipate" here, but remember, please, that many people have looked forward to things as certain and had that thing not come to pass. Just ask any Doomsday cult. World's still here, isn't it? And yet Nancy Leider anticipated its end in, what, 2003?

(And thanks, Jim; we English majors must fight the good fight of aiding comprehension. And I stand corrected, Worzel.)

[Baloo]

No. Fal' is a methodology, not a theory.

Sorry, you've said that already but I didn't made the difference between 'methodology' and 'theory'. Actually I still don't (or it seems that I'm using in a different way the word 'method').
Could you provide a short explanation or a link in order to clarify this difference for a novice? Thanks.

[hhEb09'1]

How right you are! Kuhn's reputation is especially curious.

[Added: Oops. If you don't want to sign up for a free account to read that linked article, try this one.]

Which article are you referring to, at that second link?